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Abstract 
 
 
This essay considers the economic performance of East Asia’s two largest economies 
in the second half of the twentieth century and debates prospects for the first half of 
the twenty-first. The discussion takes place in the context of dynamic strategy theory. 
First in Japan, and then later in China, ‘developmental’ states adopted strikingly 
successful industrialisation strategies with a common thread of outward orientation. 
Outward orientation is distinguished from export dependence. The former is an auto-
catalyzing sub-strategy that can sustain an economy all the way to full membership of 
the strategic core. Outright export dependent strategies, in contrast, are finite and 
imitative rather than auto-catalyzing, leaving their practitioners highly exposed to 
adverse external shocks. Japan’s experience of strategic rise, stagnation and eventual 
exhaustion is articulated at length to illustrate this important distinction.  
 
China’s own outward-oriented strategy, which is currently stimulating rapid economic 
growth and differs in many important respects from Japan’s, is then analysed in an 
attempt to examine its future viability. China’s prospects for adapting an alternative 
strategy prior to exhaustion are then considered. The conclusion is that it is reasonable 
to expect China’s strategic leadership to attempt to transition towards a sub-strategy 
that continues to sponsor industrialization through exploitation of the mass internal 
market in the broad context of outward orientation. Furthermore, the contemporary 
sub-strategy is clearly far from exhausting itself. However, the risks are 
consequential. On balance, prospects for a successful transition are sound but not 
overwhelming. An Asian-facing resource rich economy such as Australia should 
actively hedge the risks of unsuccessful transition.  
 
In the face of this uncertainty, Australian strategists are thankfully not facing an 
independent binary choice. To hedge against the possibility of the more pessimistic 
projections coming to fruition in China, thereby unhinging a resource dependent sub-
strategy, Australia must make an independent effort to make an assertive move 
towards the upper echelons of productivity performance. This will involve a 
wholesale reassessment of the scale of national resources that should be directed to 
the innovation infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
East Asia
1 represented approximately 15% of world output in 1950. By 1975, led by the 
rapid expansion of Japan, that share had risen to 20%. At the turn of the millennium East 
Asia was contributing 25% of output, despite the temporary setback of a deep recession 
in 1997-98 and Japan’s diabolical performance in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 1.1 shows how impressive this performance has been in comparative historical 
perspective. The underlying data are from Maddison (2003). The curves illustrate twenty 
year periods when a prominent region or country made relatively rapid gains in its share 
of global growth. Japanese expansion between 1954 and 1974 is the most dramatic 
economic rise in the historical record. China’s re-integration with the global economy 
after 1978 is a close second. The diffusion of Britain’s industralisation strategy to 
Western Europe in the nineteenth century looks somewhat meek in comparison, while the 
rise of the post-bellum United States was consistent and protracted rather than explosive.  
 
This superior economic performance has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars 
across the social sciences. Orthodox economists have sought to account for the sources of 
this “miraculous” growth (Denison & Chung 1976, Young 1995, Krugman 1994, IMF 
2006, Wang 2007). Development economists have found East Asia a fertile testing 
ground for the generalized theories put forward in other contexts (Fei & Ranis 1964, 
Minami 1973, Rosovsky 1979, Sugihara 2007). Political scientists and economists 
outside the mainstream have highlighted the elevated role of East Asian ‘developmental 
states’ (Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Haggard 1996, Woo-Cumings 1999, 
Yamamura, Chang & Rowthorn 1995, Evans 1995). Others have been drawn to 
distinctive Asian firm structures and the institutionalized links between finance and 
industry (Zysman 1983, Aoki and Patrick 1994, Sheard 1996, Woo 1999, Vitols 2001, 
Tipton 2007). Economic historians and comparative political economists have also made 
much of the “non-liberal” approach of East Asia (Dore 2000, Streek 2001, Yamamura 
2003). The implication of East Asian economic growth for the global balance of power, 
first in the Japanese context and now increasingly with respect to China, has been an 
especially productive theme (Vogel 1979, Garnaut 1989, Thurow 1992, Fallows 1994, 
Nye 2004, Kim 2004, Calder 1995, Bernstein and Munro 1997).   
 
This vast literature has identified the proximate drivers of Asian economic growth as a 
high savings rate, the rapid investment rates it facilitated, a demographic dividend and 
large scale urbanization, technological and productivity catch-up, and centrally, an 
outward orientation for manufacturing. Alongside these macroeconomic fundamentals 
are distinctively ‘Asian’ institutions, including the developmental leadership of the state 
(in the form of an elite bureaucracy) so painstakingly documented by successive 
generations of scholars. An amalgam of these observations has become the consensus 
model of East Asian economic development.  
 
Missing from this body of work is a coherent dynamic theory that makes systematic sense 
of East Asia’s rise in the broadest context. This essay attempts to make an initial attempt 
at stitching the breach. The framework adopted owes a profound debt to the cumulative 2 
 
work of Graeme Snooks (1993, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). The general Snooksian 
model of global strategic transition (1999), a corollary of dynamic strategy theory (1996, 
1998a) is the apposite starting point for the analysis of East Asian economic 
development.  
 
The argument revolves around a form of the Snooksian strategy function (1999: chapter 
12) modestly adapted to the East Asian economic experience. This model of dynamic 
interaction between the strategic outcome and strategic instruments is first applied to the 
Japanese experience of rise, stagnation and exhaustion in the second half the twentieth 
century. The finite nature of Japan’s industrialization strategy once it had transitioned 
from outward orientation to export dependence is clearly illustrated. Policy failures at 
critical moments of the potential transition phase condemned the economy to a point of 
outright strategic exhaustion and deflation in the 1990s.  
 
The discussion then proceeds to China. An equivalent theoretical grid is brought to bear 
upon the Middle Kingdom. The initial task is to assess the approximate time at which 
China’s own outward oriented industrialization sub-strategy might exhaust itself. The 
basic conclusion is that China has some time yet – measured perhaps in decades rather 
than years – before its contemporary sub-strategy exhausts completely. The extension 
task is to assess Chinese prospects for successful transition to an eventual replacement 
strategy, a task at which Japan failed in the last twenty years of the twentieth century. The 
conclusion is that China will do better than Japan regarding this fundamental imperative.  
 
Despite cautious optimism regarding China’s strategic prospects, the risk that China 
exhausts its contemporary strategy earlier than anticipated without a substitute in place, 
and that China thereby suffers a period of stagnation or worse, are not zero. Ergo, it 
would be poor policy for those states that benefit most from the current and prospective 
‘China boom’ to eschew the challenges of active strategic pursuit in favour of passive 
reliance on the resource terms of trade to fuel long run prosperity. In short, an Asian-
facing country such as Australia should hedge the risks of unsuccessful strategic 
transition in China. The paper will conclude with some observations specific to the 
Australian context. The main prescription for Australian policy makers is that a dual track 
of investment in the innovation and physical infrastructure is called for, on a scale not yet 
conceived of in the timid ambitions of past administrations. 
 
2. The strategy function and the strategic transition 
 
This section formally introduces the strategy function.    
 
O = f (N, K, R, T, E, SO, SL, SI)   (1) 
 
The strategic outcome, O, is proxied by gross domestic product (GDP)
2. O is a function 
of strategic instruments: N is labour, K is the capital stock, R is natural resource 
endowment, T is the stock of available technology, tacit and realisable, E is economies of 
scale, and S is ‘strategic’, with subscripts O, L and I representing organizations, 3 
 
leadership
3 and ideas respectively (Snooks 1999: 219). In lay terms, the left hand side is 
the “end” and the right hand side is the “means”. 
 
Function (1) can be simplified to 
 
O = f (P, T, E,π)       (2) 
 
P represents the stock of physical inputs: labour, resources and capital. T and E are 
unchanged from their definitions in (1). The πsignifies a vector comprised of the strategic 
variables SO, SL and SI.  Expanding further, πis an increasing function of strategic 
confidence (subscript C) and the price signal, strategic inflation (subscript P). 
 
π = f (SC, SP)      (3) 
 
So, the strategic outcome O relies upon physical factors, technological factors and 
strategic factors. The feedback mechanisms between these factors, which are determined 
by the strategic pursuits of materialist man (Snooks 1996), endow the model with 
dynamic characteristics. The underlying concept that allows the induction of the strategy 
function is that of strategic demand (Snooks 1998: 141-165). Strategic demand is the 
effective realizable desire of decision makers regarding the gamut of inputs relevant to 
their survival and prosperity. This driving force manifests itself in the pursuit of dynamic 
strategies and sub-strategies.  
 
The natures of the strategic factors that enter the function are time and context variant. 
They depend upon the technological underpinnings of the prevailing dynamic strategy 
and the sub-strategies that are pursued under its rubric. The nature of π under a conquest 
strategy will be very different to πin the context of a family multiplication strategy 
(Snooks 1996). The nature of π will depend on the creativity of the strategic decision 
makers involved, the problems they face and the mix of physical and technical factors 
available. From this point forward, all discussion of π will be in the context of the 
contemporary global dynamic strategy of technological change.  
 
It is the spread of the dynamic strategy of technological change from the strategic core 
that drives the contemporary global strategic transition (Snooks 1999). The global 
strategic transition (hereafter GST) is the process whereby non- and anti-strategic 
countries are drawn into the “vortex” of technologically driven economic growth in the 
strategic core. The advance of the GST brings global output closer to its potential level.  
 
A non- or anti-strategic society is unable or unwilling to unlock the synergy between the 
factors in the strategy function. Further, the non- or anti-strategic society is constrained 
by rent-seeking (redistributive) behaviour. Conversely the strategic society is propelled 
by profit-seeking (surplus producing) activity. Potential output in non- and anti-strategic 
societies is limited by their call on physical resources, the size of the internal market and 
a static and low-lying indigenous technological attainment. Potential output in strategic 
societies has a higher ceiling supported by economies of scale from specialization and 
servicing a global market, a greater call on resources through the ability to trade and a 4 
 
productivity premium conditioned by π. In the language of growth accounting, strategic 
countries will achieve a higher rate of TFP. 
 
3. Japan’s strategic pursuit 
 
Japan doubled its share of global output in the three decades from the beginning of the 
Korean War. Over the same timeframe Japan was able to more than triple its share of 
global exports. In 1950, Japanese output per worker was just one fifth of the US level. 
The gap was about to narrow fast. In the ten years to 1960, Japan’s labour productivity 
gap with the United States closed by an average of 1½ percentage points per year. In the 
following ten years, the gap closed at the accelerated pace of just under 3 percentage 
points per year. By 1990, Japanese GDP per capita had reached 81% of the US level.
4  
 
Viewing the Japanese case through the lens of the strategy function illustrates that a 
combination of strategic leadership, strategic organizations, the utilisation of a backlog of 
readily attainable technology, ample labour supply and the economies of scale emerging 
from an aggressive outward orientation can be an expansionary elixir. In short, Japan was 
a vivid example of the potential benefits to be harvested from discretionary participation 
in the global strategic transition. 
 
There is a structural break in modern Japan’s strategic pursuit. Between the Meiji 
restoration of 1868 and the end of the Pacific War in 1945, the Japanese state pursued a 
conquest strategy (Beasley 1987, Gordon 2000). The strategy was manifest in the 
propaganda slogan “rich nation, strong army” and the rise of the “Black Ocean” 
(established 1880) and the “Black Dragon” (established 1901) ultra-nationalist 
expansionist lobbies. Much later, the “co-prosperity” rhetoric was enacted in the same 
tradition. 
 
Japan’s industrialization pattern was inseparable from its conquest strategy. They were 
mutually reinforcing. Japan’s initial success in pursuing a military-industrial expansion 
path was illustrated by a string of annexations and victorious campaigns in North Asia, 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific stretching from the 1890s to the 1940s. Japan’s resounding 
victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904/5) is a true landmark in global history – the 
defeat of a European power, Russia, by an emerging strategic state outside the European 
core. The Japanese victory encouraged Britain, the dominant naval power and the state 
with the farthest flung imperial holdings, to shore up its reciprocal defence arrangements 
with the Japanese. These arrangements included an assurance that British Singapore 
would go unmolested. The global balance of power had an upstart new player. 
 
However, unconditional surrender to the Allied forces in 1945, and the subsequent 
dismantling of the constitutional infrastructure of the militant polity, signaled the 
exhaustion of this once lucrative dynamic strategy. A new approach was required.  
 
After a short period of stagnation under Allied occupation Japan rose quickly from the 
mire. The Korean War of 1950 to 1953, with its broad global political implications and 
the immense procurement demands that sprung from it, was a major influence on Japan’s 5 
 
next strategic choice. Japanese industry, wounded but not wholly incapacitated, bounded 
back to life. The continuity of the basic elements of the industrial complex pre and post 
Occupation has been noted by many scholars of firm structure, state-industry relations 
and corporate governance (Bisson 1954, Hadley 1970, Gerlach 1992, Schaede 1994). 
Equally, the elite bureaucracy that had so ably steered military-industrial development in 
practical and ideological terms was still basically intact (Johnson 1982, Gao 1997). In the 
first four and a half decades of the twentieth century, business and the state were bound 
together by confidence in the over-arching imperial strategy. In the 1950s strategic 
confidence would again furnish a state-industry alliance in Japan (McKay 1999). In the 
latter instance the umbrella strategy was no longer military in nature. The strategy was to 
enter into the GST, under the technological sponsorship of the United States.  
 
Under this broad theme, the first point of order was to leverage off Japan’s existing light 
and heavy industrial labour force while replacing destroyed and redundant capital stock 
with the best technology available. The state provided strategic leadership by channeling 
what was then scarce capital into priority uses that were in accord with the peaceful 
industrialization strategy (Calder 1993, McKay 1999). The enormous investments this 
policy accommodated meant that Japan’s basic materials industries were able to derive 
huge economies of scale and establish high levels of international competitiveness.  
 
Japan’s downstream manufacturing producers were therefore able to consume 
competitively priced intermediate goods, helping them to lift their own competitiveness 
relative to imports and enabling them to build global market share. These foreign 
exchange earnings (controlled by the Ministry of Finance under surrender requirements at 
this stage)
5 could then be used to access imported technology. This enabled firms to 
progressively move up the value chain and increase productivity. As the demands of 
downstream manufacturers grew, the upstream sector felt comfortable adding even 
further capacity. This is a clear example of the interaction of strategic leadership and 
strategic organizations on the demand side unlocking latent potential in the supply side of 
the economy. It is strategic confidence producing a virtuous circle of self-sustaining 
economic growth.  
 
The technology required for upgrading the capital stock was easily acquired by import. 
Much of that technology came from the United States, who felt an economically strong 
(if militarily emasculated) Japan would become a highly valuable Cold War ally in the 
potentially volatile north-east Asian crescent (Calder 1995). The majority of Japan’s 
import basket was comprised of capital goods, energy and other raw materials. Japan also 
paid a large amount of royalties and licensing fees for access to foreign intellectual 
property. Japan’s approach of procuring technology directly, rather than absorbing the 
large foreign direct investment inflows that would characterize industrialization sub-
strategies elsewhere in Asia, is an important point of differentiation. The contrast with 
China’s approach is central to the conclusions eventually drawn. 
 
At this point it is important to differentiate between outward orientation and export 
dependence. Outward orientation indicates that a priority is given to issues of 
competitiveness in the tradable sector encompassing both exportables and importables.
6 6 
 
External demand is important but domestic demand issues are not neglected. 
Competitiveness is recognized as vital to generate offshore sales and to compete with and 
displace imports at home. Outward orientation is reflected in a rising trade to GDP ratio, 
but the trade to GDP ratio itself need not be high in absolute terms.  
 
In contrast, export dependence is a narrow focus on servicing external demand at the 
expense of developing the domestic economy. A high absolute ratio of trade to GDP is a 
necessary but not sufficient signifier. Export dependence manifests itself in a consistent 
excess of exports over imports and saving over investment. Export dependence leaves 
economic growth at the mercy of adverse terms of trade shocks, fluctuations in external 
demand and malignant alterations in the institutional backdrop for international trade. 
 
It is a common misconception that Japan was dependent on export growth through its 
rapid development phase. That was not the case. The economy was oriented outward but 
not export dependent. As figure 3.1 illustrates, Japan consistently ran a deficit on its 
international trade through the 1950s, 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Japan’s 
national accounts report a deficit on net exports for 87 consecutive quarters from March 
1955 to September 1976. Over this period private domestic demand grew at an 
impressive average rate of 8.8% per annum. Export and import growth were both higher 
at 13.7% and 13.2% respectively, but the domestic economy was still growing at a much 
faster pace than the rest of the world. The export share of GDP rose from approximately 
3% in 1955 to 8% in 1976. In the same time period the import share rose from 
approximately 4% in 1955 to 8% in 1976. In other words, Japan’s “early strategy” trade 
deficit of 1% of GDP took two decades to erase. Japan exhibits a clear outward 
orientation in this period but it was certainly not export dependent.  
 
The fact that Japan’s economy was not export dependent does not mean that is was 
particularly balanced. The supra-normal development of Japan’s industrial complex 
under the broad strategy of outward orientation left other areas of the economy under-
developed. Channeling funds to strategic industries on a preferential basis requires 
another domestic sector (or the rest of the world) to provide funds on a disadvantageous 
basis.  
 
It is domestic agents under the influence of the strategic leadership that are the only 
realistic candidates for this funding role. The observed home bias of investors (French & 
Poterba 1991, Lewis 1999) implies that offshore funding is not to be consistently relied 
upon to fund a long term strategic imperative. An industrialisation strategy obviously 
demands that funds be made available to the corporate sector. The household sector, the 
critical saver and ultimate lender in the economy, is the prime candidate to be ‘taxed’ to 
sponsor outward-oriented industrialization.
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Marxist scholars have argued that Japan’s strategic leadership sided with capital over 
labour (Takuro 1989). More subtly, it can be argued that Japanese welfare capitalism 
developed under a system of indirect transfers to labour intermediated by capital (McKay 
1999, 2007). 
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This proposition can be illustrated by an examination of the terms of trade faced by the 
household and corporate sectors.
8 Tremendous real economic growth in Japan was 
accompanied by a sustained rise in the aggregate consumer price level. Japanese 
consumer prices rose at an average annual pace of 5.6% in the 1960s, against a 2.8% 
average in the United States. Japanese inflation accelerated to 8.9% in the 1970s, against 
a 7.7% average in the United States. Japan’s consumer price level rose by a cumulative 
277% over two decades, against a 145% expansion in the United States. So, Japanese 
firms were able to consistently raise the price of that portion of their output consumed by 
domestic households. 
 
To proxy the inter-sectoral terms of trade, we can contrast the 5.6% rate of increase in 
consumer prices in the 1960s to the performance of the producer price level. Producer 
prices rose just 0.9% per annum in that decade. A huge profit margin for the corporate 
sector is apparent. The comparable figures for the United States in the 1960s are 2.8% 
(consumer prices) and 1.7% (producer prices), a substantially narrower margin. Over the 
two decades from 1960 to 1980 Japan’s producer price level rose at an average of 4.0% 
per annum against a 7.3% lift in consumer prices. The respective US data are 4.8% and 
5.2%. Japanese firms were consuming super-normal profits in this twenty year period. 
They clearly enjoyed substantial pricing power at the retail level: at the expense of 
households. The combination of external market share gains and a captive home market 
that expanded relatively rapidly was an immensely profitable combination. 
 
The orthodox theorist may frown at these figures and take them as a sign that aggregate 
policy settings were imprudent. Yet such analysis is internally contradictory. Mainstream 
economics at once applauds higher real wages, productivity catch-up and the increased 
international purchasing power achieved by real exchange rate appreciation, while 
looking askance at the rate of relative price gains that achieve them. This theoretical 
curiosity ignores the fact that economies are not immaculately conceived at contemporary 
living standards.  
 
These contradictions are overcome by the Snooksian concepts (1998a, 1999) of strategic 
and non-strategic inflation. The former is the result of participation in the “vortex” of the 
global strategic transition. Strategic inflation is the signaling mechanism whereby 
strategic pioneers are rewarded and strategic imitators are attracted. Persistent strategic 
inflation reinforces confidence in the underlying choice of strategy, creating the auto-
catalyzing surges in economic growth that characterize the historical record.
9 A 
deceleration in the rate of strategic inflation can undermine confidence in an existing 
strategy. Outright declines in the price level may be taken as evidence of malaise beyond 
the ultimate point of strategic exhaustion. We will return to this final point when 
discussing the Japanese experience in the 1990s. 
 
Returning to the strategy function, recall that the strength of the vector of strategic inputs, 
π, conditions the effective deployment of physical inputs, demand for investment, the 
productive use of the stock of knowledge and the ability to achieve economies of scale in 
production. The strength of πis in turn a positive function of strategic confidence and 
strategic inflation.  8 
 
 
In Japanese economic history these relationships are illustrated vividly. The presence of 
strategic confidence among the strategic leadership and the various cluster of strategic 
organizations was reinforced by the extremely consistent price signal detailed above. 
That sparked and sustained the process of strategic imitation
10, which encourages the 
mobilization of more and more capital for the strategic pursuit as societal confidence in 
the strategy builds. Successful strategists – pioneers and imitators - generated large and 
consistent surpluses.  
 
4. A technical aside on strategic exhaustion 
 
Outward orientated industrialization was an ideal sub-strategy to exploit the golden years 
of the 1960s, as Japan’s record emphasizes. It obviously functions best against a benign 
external backdrop. It also demands an ability to develop with the changing demand 
climate and its concomitant, the retention of competitiveness. These conditions require a 
great deal of flexibility at the macro and micro level. If flexibility is lost the ability to 
compete beyond the contemporary product cycle is not guaranteed.  
 
There is the continual danger that outward orientation, which is an auto-catalyzing sub-
strategy, may become export dependence, which is not. Outward orientation is an all-
encompassing endeavour. Export dependence may result in the siloing of the non-export 
sector, implying that aggregate productivity growth will lag. This is an enormously 
important point for the resolution of the core issues under discussion. 
 
Export dependent industrialization is a finite sub-strategy that can exhaust itself – or be 
rendered obsolete - under a number of circumstances. First of all, a producing country 
may expand its global market share to saturation point. Crudely, a strategic country can 
become a victim of its own success. The “saturation point” is the global market share 
threshold beyond which the producing country can no longer seriously expect to grow its 
sales at a pace materially different from the rate of expansion of the global market itself. 
This constraint is only likely to apply to a “mega-state” (Snooks 1998a, 1999, Thurow 
1992, Murakami 1996) operating at the technological frontier.  
 
There is a special case of this broad mode of exhaustion. A country below the size of a 
mega-state may define the technological frontier in its areas of strongest competence and 
reach a dominant market share in these sectors
11. If these fields of endeavour represent a 
large element of the producing country’s output, if they slow down, overall growth will 
also decelerate and confidence in the sub-strategy will decline. A city state pursuing an 
entrepot sub-strategy in tandem with niche manufacturing and high finance, such as Hong 
Kong or Singapore, is unlikely to ever reach global saturation point under the general 
definition. However, entrepot economies, or small open economies with a skewed 
industrial structure or heavy dependence on a narrow pool of resources could potentially 
suffer under this special case.  
 
Two, a producing country may lose the competitive advantages that enabled it to pursue a 
particular style of industrialization in the first place. This may come about for a multitude 9 
 
of reasons. They include a relative decline in the strength of the producing country’s 
πrising production costs at home from an uncompetitive non-traded sector, a sustained 
adverse terms of trade shock, technological innovation in competing locales, a decline in 
education levels, the rise of a rent seeking elite
12 and a range of potential policy errors. 
This style of exhaustion will first become evident in a reduced rate of catch-up to the 
income levels of the leading countries. A sustained and material decline in relative 
income levels is incontrovertible proof of strategic exhaustion. 
 
There is an important special case of declining competitive advantage. A producing 
country may have achieved an unnaturally high global market share through a 
constellation of policies (such as tariffs, subsidies, tax exemptions, opaque quarantine, an 
under-valued exchange rate, preferential access to finance, preferential procurements, 
weak internal competition policy and other “behind the border” factors) that it no longer 
finds palatable at higher income levels. Or its trading partners find the measures 
increasingly repugnant and eventually offer retaliation. Or their design may be such that 
they are eventually able circumvented by external and internal strategists, perhaps due to 
seemingly unrelated policy changes elsewhere that unpredictably weaken the mercantilist 
apparatus. Removing, by-passing or altering the policy framework that supported the ex 
ante level of market share will see a reduction in market share ex post. The ex ante sub-
strategy can still give way to an alternative that also targets gains in global market share 
under a more sustainable policy umbrella, but the ex ante sub-strategy is exhausted 
nonetheless. Discretionary reforms of this nature are often difficult to enact due to the 
contra-strategic incentives of embedded distributional interests (Olson 1982, see note 8).  
 
Three, external events may render the sub-strategy obsolete. If the degree of global 
openness to trade collapsed for any reason, an export dependent industrialization sub-
strategy would collapse. An event that cuts off access to crucial technology or resources 
for a meaningful amount of time could also have this effect. Cyclical changes in demand 
do not necessarily undermine an export dependent sub-strategy. A secular alteration in 
global demand structures is another matter. If the export-dependent country is unable to 
adapt within a reasonable timeframe, it would enter relative decline.  
 
These issues can be helpfully summarized in diagrammatic form. Consider figure 4.1. 
The vertical axis measures the world export share of the representative strategic country. 
Its income level relative to the strategic core is measured on the horizontal. The curve is a 
path through time. A chronological move to the right along the 45 degree line indicates a 
rising share of world exports and a narrower income gap.  
 
A country successfully pursuing an outward-oriented industrialisation sub-strategy all the 
way to membership of the strategic core would be expected to generate a convex curve 
like that in the diagram.  
 
An export dependent sub-strategy may generate a similar path for a time, or even out-
perform it temporarily if external conditions boom. However, an adverse turn of external 
events will swiftly generate either regression or at best stagnation. Progress on both axes 
would cease. Depending on the nature of the shock the curve may divert horizontally to 10 
 
the left (stable export share but relative income decline) or diagonally down to the left 
(relative decline on both measures). The former situation is actually a special case. It 
would only result if a shock reduced the sales of all exporting nations with perfect 
symmetry, keeping market shares stable.  
 
The concept is illustrated further in the three trivariate diagrams that together constitute 
figure 4.2. The vertical axis represents time and the south-east and south-west axes 
correspond to the vertical and horizontal axes in figure 4.1. The degree of skew in the 
triangles shows the bias of the sub-strategy through time.  
 
The strategic administration will perceive any slowdown in export share or the rate of 
income catch-up. The response is crucial. If the slowdown is perceived to be cyclical, the 
optimal policy response is to reinforce the secular viability of the existing sub-strategy. 
Monetary and fiscal stimulus should be used to cushion the system against the temporary 
shock. That would help ensure that the degree of strategic disinflation is mitigated so as 
to prevent a damaging negative shock to strategic confidence. 
 
If the slowdown itself is perceived to be at least partially systemic – in other words, it is a 
lead indicator of future exhaustion – then the conventional counter-cyclical response may 
not be appropriate. It may be felicitous for the strategic administration to let the strategic 
disinflation run its course. That will signal strongly to potential pioneers that a 
replacement sub-strategy is required. An accommodative policy stance that increases 
nominal inflation will reduce the transparency of the strategic disinflationary signal and 
potentially create ill-placed strategic confidence. That can eventually lead to outright 
strategic deflation if false confidence feeds into excessive leverage and a doomed over 
extension of asset prices. 
 
In an abstract sense strategic exhaustion can be understood as the next observation 
succeeding the point at which marginal strategic revenues are equated with marginal 
costs. In other words, the strategy ceases to remunerate its participants, incurring losses 
while it remains extant. This point is strikingly evident in the history of imperial conquest 
societies (Snooks 1996). It is equally applicable at the sub-strategic level and therefore to 
the industrialisation themes that concern this paper. The strategic deflation signal 
triggered at the point of marginal exhaustion shows no discrimination.  
 
5. Japan’s strategic pursuit continued 
 
Japan’s strategic outcome initially exceeded the most bullish expectations. Figure 5.1 
plots Japan’s outward oriented industrialization pattern in the same terms as the 
schematic diagram presented in figure 4.1. The paired series begin in 1960 due to a lack 
of data on export shares prior to that year. The data argue that between 1960 and 1973 
Japan was the poster child for this particular “path from the periphery” (Haggard 1995).  
 
In the ten years to 1960, Japan’s income gap with the United States closed by an average 
of 1½ percentage points per year. In the following ten years, which comprise the first ten 
observations in figure 5.1, the gap closed at the accelerated pace of just under 3 11 
 
percentage points per year. Japan rose from an income level around one third of the US in 
1960 to a level of almost two thirds just ten years later. Japan’s share of world exports 
also doubled in this amazing decade.  
 
After 1970 we can see a different pattern emerging. The first half of the decade saw a 
number of external shocks impinging on Japan’s sub-strategy. The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system and the US dollar devaluation it entailed was a competitive 
jolt for Japanese producers. The oil supply shock arrived soon after.  
 
What had been an exceptionally benign international demand climate became decidedly 
fractious. The world economy had expanded at an average pace of 5.2% per annum in the 
1960s. The volume of world exports grew even faster at 7.6%. Exports grew by an 
average of 8.7% in the second half of the decade. In the first half of the 1970s world 
growth decelerated to 3.6% per annum and world export volume growth decelerated to 
5.7%. Export volumes actually declined outright in 1975. They had never expanded at 
less than a 4% annual pace in the 1960s (figure 5.2). 
 
The stupendous advance of Japan’s strategists through the second half of the 1960s 
(summarized in figure 5.3) was interrupted by the cumulative force of these adverse 
events. Japan’s world export share declined in successive years in 1972 and 1973. The 
income gap with the United States widened in a material fashion in 1974. Industrial 
production had increased five fold between 1960 and 1974. It declined by more than 20% 
peak to trough in 1974/75.  
 
These developments were understandably damaging for strategic confidence. The global 
terms of trade had shifted radically against resource poor countries. The ample supply of 
cheap fuel that had been an important source of strategic confidence in energy-intensive 
heavy industrial development was no longer guaranteed. In tandem with the abrupt 
decline in the rate of expansion in global demand, the early 1970s asked a severe question 
of Japan’s prevailing sub-strategy.  
 
In the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Japan managed to resume 
building global market share. The economy also began producing trade surpluses for the 
first time. However, its rate of catch-up to US income levels slowed to an average of just 
0.6 percentage points per annum in the ten years to 1985. In the second half of the 1980s 
that improved marginally to a catch-up rate of 0.9 percentage points per annum. Neither 
period came close to replicating the figures of the 1960s.  
 
The move to consistent trade surpluses was enabled by a number of factors. One was the 
increasing sophistication of Japanese technology. The move up the value-added chain 
meant that Japanese capital goods and high end consumer durables reached a point where 
they were reasonable substitutes for American and European imports. As these goods 
became acceptable as import substitutes they also became potential exports. So Japan 
began exporting goods they used to import while knocking competitors out of the local 
market. Indigenous innovations in the manufacturing process and in intra-firm 12 
 
information flow, well documented in the business literature (Vogel 1979 & 1985, Fuss 
and Waverman 1992, Aoki & Dore 1994, Tipton 2007), were the finishing touch. 
 
The second factor was that the energy intensity of the Japanese economy had fallen, 
reducing the import bill for every extra unit of output in the resource poor country. This 
was achieved through greater efficiency in the use of energy following the jolt of the oil 
crisis of 1973 and the favourable influence of the increasing importance of the services 
sector in overall activity. Structural change, energy intensity and emissions per capita are 
formally related by the environmental Kuznets curve. The argument here is that Japan 
made discretionary decisions to reduce energy intensity at the same time that 
developmental gravity was moving the same way. 
 
The third development was that Japanese goods made a social breakthrough with western 
consumers. In the 1960s the phrase “Made in Japan” was a euphemism for cheap and low 
quality. Export market share gains were often the result of being the cheapest rather than 
the best. It took a long time for Japanese goods to lose this stigma. But the fact that the 
social turning point came when a price advantage was still readily apparent, most visibly 
in automobiles and electronics, meant that exports were able to maintain a high rate of 
growth just as imports were slowing for the reasons expounded above.
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Fourth, a sharp decline in the investment to GDP ratio from 36.5% in 1973 to 30.5% in 
1978 was not matched by a similar drop in the savings rate. Domestic savings to GDP fell 
from 1973 to 1975 but stabilized between 32½% and 33% of GDP for the next three 
years. Three decades before the term “savings glut” entered the policy lexicon in the post 
Asian Crisis world (Bernanke 2005) Japan was pioneering the concept. 
 
A “savings glut” derived from a step decline in the investment share and resilient savings 
is a strong indicator of a decline in strategic confidence. The forces at play are 
centrifugal. Lower strategic confidence drives a reduced expectation of future returns to 
capital. This feeds directly into a higher rate of precautionary savings by households. 
Furthermore, firms increase their own savings rate by retiring debt rather than 
accumulating it. That impacts on their employment plans, which undermines household 
confidence further, which generates a further round of precautionary savings. Indeed, 
conceptually one might think of changes in strategic confidence as the savings and 
investment equivalent of the non-linear financial accelerator of mainstream 
macroeconomics (Bernanke et al 1996). 
 
As stated above, Japanese gross fixed capital formation peaked as a share of GDP in 
1973. It has been in trend decline since, even when the late 1980s bubble period is taken 
into account (figure 5.4). Unsurprisingly, capacity utilization rates in the manufacturing 
sector also peaked around this time. This major shift in the demand for capital investment 
initially reflected a loss of short term strategic confidence. It eventually developed into an 
extremely painful episode of strategic exhaustion, policy error, failed adaptation and 
strategic deflation. 
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The first and third factors relating to the move to trade surplus – the move up the value 
chain and the social recognition of Japanese goods - point towards a continuation of the 
outward oriented strategy. However, the optimistic argument must be balanced by the 
fact of the decline in the investment share of income from 1973. This under-utilization of 
the national savings supply was underpinning the surplus at the aggregate level and is 
potentially indicative of export dependence. 
 
In the 1970s a degree of ambiguity began to attach itself to Japan’s outward oriented sub-
strategy for the first time since its enactment. On the positive side formidable strength 
was apparent in the rise of a critical mass of Japanese multinational firms. These strategic 
organisations, many of whom were beneficiaries of preferential treatment in the early 
stages of the post war strategic pursuit, achieved global relevance in a number of major 
industries. These included steel, shipbuilding, automobiles, office machines, consumer 
electronics, microelectronics, general machinery, non-ferrous metals processing, 
chemicals, precision instruments, financial services, trade facilitation, construction, 
infrastructure, energy – just about everything outside of defence and aerospace.  They 
had physically out-grown state sponsorship and chafed at the continuation of bureaucratic 
oversight. With a global demand base, an increasingly international production base and 
the ability to tap offshore capital markets for funds, an alliance with the state became 
increasingly irrelevant to these firms.
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The non-traded sector was a different story. It was argued in section 3 that the inter-
sectoral terms of trade between firms and households was strongly in favour of the 
former through the 1960s and 1970s. The bureaucracy chose to subsidise outward 
oriented industrialization by suppressing returns to domestic household savers. This 
episode of a developmental state “getting the prices wrong” 
15 was pro-strategic. In the 
1970s another inter-sectoral subsidy was implicitly sanctioned. The subsidy ran from the 
competitive, high productivity portion of the economy to the uncompetitive, low 
productivity segment. This subsidy was clearly contra-strategic being inherently a matter 
of distribution rather than surplus generation.  
 
The uncompetitive portion of the economy was comprised of labour intensive industries 
in the traded sector that were past their competitive peak (e.g. textiles) but refused to go 
quietly; industries that were internationally competitive but had been suddenly saddled 
with excess capacity due to a decline in external demand for their output (e.g. 
shipbuilding); industries coddled by high levels of effective protection (e.g. agriculture) 
and industries with a degree of natural protection where domestic competition was at best 
soft and at worst corrupt (e.g. construction).  
 
For the competitive portion of the economy this sponsorship meant higher direct and 
indirect input costs, a larger tax burden and greater competition for capital, labour and 
resources than would otherwise have been the case. The response of the competitive 
sector was to move production facilities offshore. At home they were being asked to 
shoulder the burden of the weak. The contrast with the lure of cheap labour costs, tax 
concessions and other forms of preferential treatment available to the foreign direct 
investor in ambitious emerging economies was stark. As productive capacity moved 14 
 
away, the proportion of the domestic economy accounted for by lower productivity 
elements rose.  
 
The expanding presence of these lower productivity elements in the economy was a drag 
on overall competitiveness. At the same time, the large companies did even better in 
overseas markets as they lowered costs through the hollowing out process, setting up 
integrated production chains along the Asian Pacific rim (Hatch & Yamamura 1994, 
Tipton 2007: 57-61).  They also rapidly increased their brand recognition with western 
consumers. “Made in Japan” had morphed from cheap, to reliable to superior.  
 
The conventional history of the creeping development of the “dual economy”, particular 
in the context of industrial adjustment, is substantial (Katz 1998, Uriu 1996, Samuels 
1983, Calder 1988). As noted above, the negative impact of the two-track economy upon 
productivity, in tandem with the less supportive international backdrop of the 1970s and 
1970s, saw Japan’s rate of catch-up to US income levels slow to an average of just 0.6 
percentage points per annum in the ten years to 1985.  
 
In the second half of the 1980s the rate of catch-up improved marginally to 0.9 
percentage points per annum. While no period after 1973 came close to replicating the 
figures of the 1960s, to the outsider it must seem curious that Japan was able to accelerate 
its rate of catch-up after 1985 despite the substantial headwinds of the hollowing out of 
manufacturing and the impact of the post-Plaza Accord yen appreciation. Indeed, this 
could be interpreted as a signal that a sub-strategy that appeared to be tiring had gained a 
second wind. 
 
It is instructive to again turn to the scatter plots. To aid the analysis we have broken the 
sample down into distinct phases and zoomed in to magnify the observable trends. The 
decade to 1985 (figure 5.5) shows mixed returns to the outward oriented sub-strategy. 
Besides the gains made on both axes from 1979 to 1981, the results would have been 
poorly predicted by a model capturing the dynamics of the relationship in the prior phase 
(figure 5.3). It is clear that cyclical factors began to impinge more regularly on secular 
dynamic forces. The impact of US economic recession (strong catch-up for Japan) and 
the Reagan fiscal expansion and strong dollar policy (better Japanese exports but more 
impressive US income growth) can be easily seen in the data. 
 
After 1985 a new trend became apparent. The G5 Plaza Accord of that year ushered in a 
protracted era of a weaker US dollar, and its corollary, a stronger Japanese yen. This 
completed the long process of yen appreciation from its fixed rate of 360 to the dollar 
under Bretton Woods to a level more in line with its theoretical equilibrium level (figure 
5.6).
16 The violent US dollar depreciation of 1985 had a major impact on Japanese export 
market share. Japan’s share of global exports fell from 9.6% in 1985 to 8.8% in 1986, 
8.2% in 1987 and 8.0% in 1988, after which it stabilized just over 8%.  
 
This deterioration in market share could be interpreted as sign of the unwinding of a pro-
strategic policy framework that had supported an unsustainable level of market share. 
This potential mode of strategic exhaustion is discussed in section 4. However, there was 15 
 
as yet no sign of exhaustion in Japan’s relative income growth. Figure 5.7 is very clear. 
Despite the decline in export share Japan made good progress towards improving its 
relative income status. This was a strong signal to strategic agents that the sub-strategy 
continued to be viable. 
 
The strongest signal observed by strategic agents was a rapid rise in domestic asset price 
inflation. The compounding wealth effects of asset price gains were a major contributor 
to the acceleration in income growth that enabled an enhanced rate of catch-up in the late 
1980s. Strategic confidence boomed. The investment share of GDP began to rise again, 
breaking out of its long decline from the 1973 peak (figure 5.7). The performance of the 
major asset classes are illustrated in figure 5.8. These data describe one of history’s great 
bubbles. 
 
With hindsight, it is obvious that a dominant portion of the asset price signal was of the 
nominal, as opposed to the strategic, variety. Figure 5.9 plots the policy interest rate, the 
growth rate of nominal GDP and the ratio of growth rates of domestic credit and GDP. A 
strategic administration should use monetary policy to limit fluctuations in non-strategic 
or nominal inflation so that the strategic inflation signal is transparent. In Japan in the 
second half of the 1980s, an excessively easy liquidity environment multiplied the rate of 
nominal asset price inflation, sending a signal to agents that they interpreted incorrectly. 
In other words, the strategic confidence of Japanese agents was cumulating powerfully on 
the basis of faux strategic inflation that was in reality the result of a monetary policy 
error.  
 
The strategic administration obviously did not recognize the impending exhaustion of the 
prevailing sub-strategy. They may have felt that the decline in export share after 1985 
was a temporary exchange rate driven phenomenon that should be offset by easy 
domestic monetary conditions. They would have seen the narrowing of the income gap as 
a robust justification of their policy stance. Certainly they were not under any pressure to 
do otherwise. The hubris and general air of triumphalism that arose in the public 
commentary of the time is testament to that - including the growing cohort of western 
academic cheerleaders. 
 
The degree of financial leverage that usually goes along with a major rise in strategic 
confidence makes a false asset price signal particularly damaging. The unwinding of 
nominal asset price inflation when the bubble eventually burst left Japan with a balance 
sheet problem of enormous magnitude. During the bubble the corporate sector had 
accumulated immense liabilities against their rapidly increasing net worth. The banks 
providing the funds felt that the collateral was ample. Households felt vastly secure in 
their employment status and were comfortable taking out mortgages to fund property 
purchases at valuations that implied extreme ratios to average income levels. Strategic 
confidence in a false paradigm built a castle on the proverbial swamp.
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As emphasized above, strategic confidence is a momentum variable. Strategic confidence 
runs from pioneers (who initially respond to a price signal) to imitators in a self-
sustaining, compounding fashion. When the price signal turns, strategic confidence can 16 
 
unwind swiftly. The transmission mechanisms of a system wide decline in strategic 
confidence are extremely difficult to arrest with conventional policy tools. In Japan’s 
case, monetary policy became impotent as demand for credit evaporated. Corporate Japan 
entered upon a decade of de-leveraging, shifting from a net ‘flow’ borrower of more than 
10% of GDP in 1990 to a substantial net lender (figure 5.10, Koo 2003). Unsurprisingly 
given this backdrop, the investment share re-entered the downtrend first sighted in the 
middle 1970s. Strategic confidence giveth and it taketh away. 
 
With the nominal inflation signal of the bubble years stripped away, a sustained strategic 
deflation of asset prices commenced. The strategic outcome through the 1990s was 
unambiguous testimony that the sub-strategy of prior decades had exhausted itself. The 
scatter plot tells the story (figure 5.11). Japan’s performance on both axes regressed 
through the 1990s. With no alternative sub-strategy in place, and a lack of flexibility that 
would have enabled a quicker work-out of the balance sheet problems bestowed by the 
1980s, Japan moved assertively backwards.  
 
Just when the sub-strategy of outward orientation exhausted itself is not precisely clear. It 
was certainly no earlier than 1973 and probably much later. It was definitely no later than 
1990 and probably earlier. 
 
The Plaza Accord of 1985, where the G5 nations agreed to address the over-valued level 
of the US dollar through coordinated interventions, and the Louvre Accord of 1987, when 
the same nations worked to stabilize the dollar, are key milestones. The former removed 
one pillar of Japan’s external strength: an undervalued exchange rate (figure 5.6). The 
latter encouraged the Bank of Japan to run an even easier monetary policy than they 
might have otherwise (figure 5.9), to counter expectations of further US dollar 
depreciation in the foreign exchange market. This exacerbated the problem of the false 
strategic signal emanating from the nominal inflation of domestic asset prices. This also 
temporarily delegated the major burden of real yen appreciation to the relative price level 
rather than the nominal exchange rate. 
 
Recall from section 4 that an export led strategy can exhaust when a constellation of 
policies supporting an excessive global market share are unwound. It would be hugely 
unfair to dismiss Japanese export market share gains over many decades as no more than 
the result of modern day mercantilism. However, it is difficult to escape from the fact that 
from the point that ambiguity began to enter the Japanese strategic picture, loosely dated 
from the middle 1970s, policy was effectively shielding agents from a pure reading of 
strategic prospects.  
 
This policy response displayed a clear misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 
strategic confidence. The correct role for a strategic administration is to nurture 
confidence in viable sub-strategies through a supportive regime. This involves both 
counter-cyclical and pro-structural policy. However, when the lead indicators of strategic 
exhaustion become evident, counter-cyclical monetary policies may hurt the strategic 
outcome in the long run. If monetary easing maintains confidence in a soon-to-exhaust 
strategy, then the administration is committing a major policy error. If a faux signal of 17 
 
strategic dynamism is communicated the incentive for pioneers to adopt alternative 
strategies is dampened when the need for innovation and experimentation is greatest.  
 
The failure of the Japanese administration to provide strategic leadership at this moment 
of intense national need is extremely conspicuous. Rather than allowing a strategic 
disinflation to unfold unfettered, the price signal was distorted until it was too late to 
adapt. The initial error was compounded by a sharp monetary tightening in 1989 and 
1990, which pricked the bubble, unleashing pent-up strategic deflationary forces over the 
entirety of the next decade.  
 
The wealth destroying decline in the Japanese price level observed over the last fifteen 
years is unambiguous evidence that the sub-strategy that had served it well previously 
had nothing left to give. The failure of the strategic administration to provide the right 
sort of leadership through the 1980s was immensely damaging – to the confidence of 
strategists and the welfare of succeeding generations. 
 
6. China’s strategic pursuit 
 
China’s pursuit of an outward oriented industrialization sub-strategy is dated to the pro-
market reforms of 1978. The economy has expanded at an approximate real pace of ten 
percent per annum over the three decades since. The headline data that describe the 
Chinese experience are broadly similar to those of Japan and the smaller economies in the 
region that have embraced a sub-strategy of outward oriented industrialization.  
 
Below the surface there are major differences within the East Asian experience. These are 
brought out in a succession of excellent area studies (Johnson 1982, Amsden 1988, Wade 
1990, Garnaut & Huang 2001) and comparative works (Deyo 1987, Amsden 2001, 
Haggard 1996). Each national sub-strategy may be regarded as sui generis. However, it is 
not difficult to argue that the national deviations we observe across East Asia are from a 
central outward oriented strategic tendency. 
 
There are a number of basic points of contrast between the pioneering path of the 
Japanese and that paved by China. China began its pursuit in 1978 at a much lower 
relative income level than the Japanese in 1950. Even today, China is still a low income 
economy. Two, China originally engaged with outward orientation after thirty years of 
socialist planning marked by pervasive state ownership of the production and financial 
complex. Japan had a continuous tradition of private capitalist enterprise in both 
production and finance. Three, China entered into its sub-strategy with deep rooted 
mistrust underpinning its relationship with the strategic core. That compares to the 
outright sponsorship of Japan by the United States. Four, China has embraced foreign 
direct investment as its core method of attracting technology. Japan has preferred its 
firms to buy technology, create indigenous competency and learn to compete via 
innovation. Five, in Japan labour was a scarce resource for most of its high growth era. 
China, by vivid contrast, has been in a position of constant labour surplus in its rural 
hinterlands. At times China has suffered from large scale unemployment due to the 
enactment of strategic change.  18 
 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the contours of China’s strategic pursuit since 1978. The data are 
equivalent to those presented in the Japanese context above. The most obvious point 
stemming from figure 6.1 is that China’s strategic pursuit is showing no sign of 
exhaustion after a quarter of a century. Indeed, China has accelerated its rate of income 
catch-up in the recent past, while making strong gains in global market share.  
 
Taking this observation as a starting point, what can be reasonably inferred about China’s 
future strategic outcomes from a combination of the theory outlined in sections 2 and 4, 
the Japanese experience as detailed in sections 3 and 5 and a balanced reading of China’s 
own fundamentals?   
 
Figure 6.2 divides China’s strategic pursuit into three time periods. They are 6.2.i, 1978 
to 1990; 6.2.ii, the 1990s; and 6.2.iii, 1999 to the present. The first panel shows a short, 
sharp increase in global market share as China initially engaged with the world. 
However, China’s market share was basically stagnant for the remainder of the period. 
Despite this failure to build on the initial surge in relative export growth, China managed 
to narrow its income gap to the United States in ten of the twelve years in the sample. 
This data argues that while China’s strategic leadership provided a clear “look outward” 
signal from 1978, the majority of its successes in this period came from sources other 
than export growth. 
 
Moving forward to the 1990s, a similar picture emerges. China continued to make 
striking gains in relative income terms, but its ability to gain export market share in the 
first half of the decade was rather mixed. Indeed, a home grown investment bubble in 
1992/94 and the consequent hard landing, which overlapped with the Asian Crisis 
slowdown, were the main swing factors in Chinese economic performance in this decade. 
The gain in export market share in the late 1990s should be viewed as a function of 
domestic excess capacity – a corollary of an internal demand shortfall - rather than any 
new-found comparative advantage. 
 
So, for the first two decades of China’s sub-strategy of international engagement, the 
evidence states that export growth was an important but far from paramount factor in the 
achievement of strategic outcomes.  
 
In the most recent sample, covering 1999 to the present, there is a striking change. 
Suddenly we observe global market share doubling within the space of a few years. This 
trend and its concomitants viz. a sharp rise in the export share of GDP and an alarmingly 
swift widening of the trade and current account surpluses, has encouraged many 
observers to proclaim that Chinese growth is export dependent. If this were the case, then 
the theory in section 4 implies that the Chinese model is highly vulnerable to a catalogue 
of potential shocks. That being the case, it is crucial to stress test the “export dependent” 
proposition before we proceed any further. 
 
The orthodox way of measuring external focus is to scale exports by GDP. Chinese 
exports are equivalent to approximately 40% of GDP today. That compares to a level 19 
 
close to 20% in 2000. Exports have grown approximately three times faster than GDP in 
that period. The contribution to growth from net exports has risen also, but not by as 
much as might be deduced from the rapid rise in the export share (figure 6.3). The reason 
net exports have been somewhat becalmed – at least until very recent history - is that the 
import share of GDP has also been rising much more sharply than in previous periods. 
This is a function not only of China’s well documented appetite for energy, food and 
metals imports (Garnaut & Song 2006b, McKibbin 2006, Chen 2006, Song & Yu 2007), 
but also China’s now dominant role as the final assembler of goods whose components 
are produced elsewhere (Athukorala 2005, Li et al 2007).  
 
Li et al (2007) present a wealth of data on China’s historical and contemporaneous place 
in cross-border manufacturing chains. Between 1992 and 2005, parts and components 
grew from 16% to 35% of China’s total manufacturing imports. Over the same period the 
global share of parts and components in total manufacturing trade has increased from 
21% to 26%, implying that the growth in China’s assembly sector is extremely dynamic.   
 
China’s role as the assembler of first resort in the Asian production chain, which has 
accelerated in line with the sharp increase in foreign direct investment following the 
WTO accession in 2001 (Chen 2007), has contributed heavily to the over-estimation of 
the export sector’s true impact on the economy. Where trade fragmentation is present on 
a substantial scale, export to GDP ratios are a very crude and potentially misleading 
metric.  
 
Comparing a gross concept (export sales) to a net concept (GDP as the sum of added 
value) is likely to overstate the importance of the former when the import component of 
exports is high or the goods are merely being trans-shipped through a territory.
18 Small 
outward looking economies such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia feature export 
to GDP ratios above 100% - an intuitively awkward result. What we should be doing is 
calculating value-added directly attributable to the export sector and scaling that amount 
by GDP. One such exercise (Anderson 2007) shows that by controlling for the import and 
extra-sectoral domestic content of export production, export value-added currently 
accounts for no more than 8% of Chinese GDP, up from around 5% at the turn of the 
century.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been substantial and consistent since the 
early 1990s, ranging from a low of 2.6% of GDP in 2006 to a high of 5.8% of GDP in 
1994.
19 The sectoral composition of inward FDI has reflected the strategic leadership’s 
dual focus on procuring technology and utilizing its comparative advantage in labour 
intensive products. An increased emphasis on attracting inflows in higher value-added 
sectors has been particularly noticeable since the WTO accession. This has manifested 
itself in an apparent increase in the sophistication of China’s export basket (Rodrik 2006).  
 
The share of China’s exports accounted for by electrical machinery and automatic data 
processing equipment has risen from just over 7% in 1994, to 18% in 2001, to 24% in 
2006. The share of apparel exports has gone in the other direction: from 20%, to 14% to 
10% (figure 6.4). Anderson (2007) argues that the import content of labour intensive light 20 
 
industrial exports such as apparel averages just over 30%. In electronics, import content 
is currently around 70%, and was as high as 95% at times prior to WTO. The conclusion 
is straightforward. By changing the structure of its exports, as illustrated by this simple 
two sector example, China has raised the import content of its exports and by definition 
has lowered the domestic content. This is contributing to an unusually large spike in 
China’s apparent share of global exports, and is vastly overstating the importance of the 
export sector to the local economy. 
 
A final illustration of this point is that foreign funded enterprises have become 
increasingly important in the export and import sectors, consistent with the impressive 
stock of traded sector FDI that has been accumulating over the last decade and a half. 
Figure 6.4 shows the consistent increase in the share of exports accounted for by foreign 
funded enterprises. Foreign firms started from a higher base on the import side, but they 
have still managed to expand their share consistently so far this decade.  
 
This finding can now be related back to the apparent surge in China’s share of world 
exports that originally sparked comment in relation to figure 6.2.iii. Presenting the global 
export shares in raw form, and adjusting for the activities of foreign funded enterprises, 
China’s strategic pursuit since the late 1990s is re-cast in figure 6.5. When the exports of 
foreign funded enterprises are removed from the data the nature of China’s strategic 
footprint looks remarkably different. The argument that indigenous Chinese firms are 
highly leveraged to external demand looks like nonsense based upon this re-statement. 
While it is obvious that some of the income catch-up is also attributable to the activities 
of foreign firms, any reasonable discount factor we could apply would not alter the basic 
picture. Since the late 1990s, China has narrowed its income gap with the United States 
consistently, while increasing its adjusted global export share in less spectacular fashion. 
These observations are indicative of outward orientation and are far from meeting the 
thresholds for export dependence. 
 
Having dealt with the issue of export dependence, we can re-focus on the forward 
looking analysis. Recall functions (1) and (2) from section 2 above. They argue that the 
strategic outcome, GDP, is related to the dynamic interplay of the available physical 
factors, the stock of technology, scale economies and a vector of strategic factors. 
Physical factors are endowments with gradual and predictable development paths; 
technology is dependent on both the internal and external state of knowledge; scale 
economies are related to demand (market size) and supply (investment to meet said 
demands); and the key strategic factors are ideas, organizations and leadership.  
 
Dealing with the most straightforward element first, China’s outward oriented 
industrialization strategy will continue to benefit from the absorption of foreign 
technologies. China’s productivity level
20 was just 5½% of the United States’ in 1978. 
China’s relative productivity level rose to approximately 16¼% by 2006. Figure 6.6 
shows that Japan began its rapid period of ‘catch-up’ at a relative productivity level 
closer to 30%. This enormous productivity gap implies that China will retain the 
“advantages of backwardness” (Gerschenkron 1962) for a substantial period of time 
measured in decades not years. The periphery beginning to engage with the strategic 21 
 
core, and raising productivity levels thereby, is central to the “global strategic transition” 
of Snooks (1999).  
 
China’s strategic administration has recognized the value of imported technology and has 
established a welcoming attitude to FDI at all levels of the manufacturing value chain. 
Openness to such flows is an illustration of the obvious fact that China is participating in 
the global strategic transition in part due to a discretionary decision of the leadership. 
Changes in the FDI policy regime over time have sought to increase the sophistication of 
inflows, as documented above with reference to export structure. This guidance from 
policymakers has compressed the timeframe in which positive strategic structural change 
might have taken place otherwise. 
 
In addition to the productivity benefits of introducing better technology to workers 
already in the formal productive sector, China is promised additional stimulus from the 
urbanization process. When it is explicitly accounted for, rather than subsumed in the 
total factor productivity residual, growth accountants argue that the urbanization process 
has directly contributed between 1 and 1½ percentage points of Chinese annual output 
growth since 1999 and approximately ¾ of a percentage point between 1978 and 1998 
(Wang 2007, He et al 2007, He and Kuijs 2007, Cf Qiu et al 2006, Perkins and Rawski 
2007).  
 
Projections by the United Nations (2005), summarized in figure 6.7, argue that this 
particular source of support for the current sub-strategy will remain in place, once again, 
for at least a decade. The UN’s demographers assume that China will achieve the 
projected global average rate of urbanization by 2030. Using the UN figures, Wang 
argues that urbanization will continue to provide more than one percentage point of 
growth annually to 2020 (figure 6.8). 
 
There are currently two major impediments to the rural/urban labour transfer proceeding 
in linear fashion towards global norms as envisaged by the UN. The first is the hukou 
system of household registration. Under hukou, China is perhaps the only country that 
actively discriminates against its internal migrant workers (Meng 2000, Knight and Song 
2001, Du et al 2006). The main form of discrimination is the withholding of the social 
security benefits that are freely available to registered urban residents. By staying in their 
place of registration workers can maintain their call on benefits. This is one reason why 
the rate of Chinese industrialization has outpaced urbanization by a substantial margin up 
to this point.
21  
 
Further impediments to a more rapid rural-urban labour transfer are the fundamental 
issues of property rights, land tenure, transfer and use. One informal estimate puts the 
nationwide proportion of land use that is technically illegal as between 60% and 90%.
22 
The inability of peasant farmers to sell or lease their land – if land is left unattended it 
will be appropriated under opaque compensation arrangements – makes the relocation 
decision a more complex calculation than the rural/urban wage gap make it appear on the 
surface. Local and county government corruption, rapacious developers and the 22 
 
administrative incentive to skew land use to maximize revenues all contribute to a 
general reluctance to leave land unattended.  
 
The Chinese administration clearly recognizes that urbanization will be a vitally 
important contributor to the nation’s strategic outcome. To that end, policy experiments 
related to land transfers (Guangdong in the Pearl River delta) and hukou reform 
(Chongqing and Sichuan, contiguous regions in central China) are underway. Assuming 
that these experiments are implemented successfully, and gradually introduced 
elsewhere, it is reasonable to infer that the urbanization trend will enhance Chinese 
strategic outcomes for some time yet. Indeed, the current material constraints on internal 
migration have suppressed the supply of workers. This pent-up supply of labour can be 
released in a reasonably controlled fashion at a time of the administration’s choosing by 
the policy adjustments sketched above.
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Urbanisation will also create net new demand for dwelling units and associated 
infrastructure. The national average number of persons per household was 3.2 in 2006. 
Households in Beijing and Shanghai, the two largest cities, are much smaller at 2.6 and 
2.7 respectively. Under these parameters we can do a quick back of the envelope 
calculation. The 420 million or so internal migrants expected by 2030 will require 158 
million dwellings, versus the 131 million (a higher end estimate) they have left behind. 
That implies a significant long run investment in the dwelling stock that will support a 
high rate of capital formation for a long time to come. 
 
In outright terms, the contribution to potential supply from an expanding labour force and 
a declining dependency ratio will remain positive until the half decade of 2015 to 2020 
(Golley and Tyers 2006, Perkins and Rawski 2007). China’s demographic transition
24 has 
been accelerated by the twin forces of the one child policy and the second generation 
shadow of the disastrous famine produced by the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s. 
In the absence of a change in participation rates or immigration flows, at this point the 
direct contribution to growth from this angle will slowly decline. Golley and Tyers 
(2006) argue that a rise in aged participation rates has the potential to substantially 
mitigate the negative impact of the lower rate of new entrants predicted by the observable 
demographic profile. The rate of labour force participation of various age cohorts can be 
manipulated by targeted fiscal measures. China’s strategic administration has every 
opportunity to prepare for this impending stagnation in labour force growth by managing 
the participation incentive matrix for older workers. China’s ageing trajectory is 
summarised in the two panels of figure 6.8. 
 
The identification and exploitation of scale economies is a robust element of China’s 
current sub-strategy. The enhancement of scale economies will be a major contributor to 
the success of its future path. In direct contract to the sequence of development in the 
United States or Germany, China has made greater gains in accessing external scale 
economies than in integrating its domestic markets. Market segmentation studies that 
attempt to quantify growth spillovers and the co-movement of cycles across Chinese 
provinces show only modest evidence of intra-national integration (Groeneweld et al 
2006, Golley and Groeneweld 2007).  23 
 
 
At a more practical level, it is possible to construct proxies of market integration from 
detailed logistics data. Figure 6.9 shows the ratio between the average growth rate of 
GDP and the average growth rate of the volume of various forms of freight for the period 
2001 to 2006. The freight categories and their ratios to GDP growth (Δfreight/ΔGDP) are 
road 0.6, rail 0.8, air 1.1, ocean going (1.5) and river going (0.9). Predominantly domestic 
logistics (road, rail, and river) have all grown at a slower pace than overall GDP. 
Predominantly international logistics (air and ocean) have grown significantly faster. 
These data offer micro support for the thesis that China’s internal markets are weakly 
integrated. Further, the data argues strongly that integration with external markets is 
expanding extremely rapidly. This last point is consistent with the spectacular lift in 
China’s share of world exports, the role of the component and assembly trade in this 
phenomenon (which by its nature amplifies freight volumes), and China’s rapid rise to a 
paramount position in the global energy, food and resources trade. 
 
The currently low level of domestic market integration offers China a clear opportunity to 
alter strategic course when the stimulus to growth from technological catch-up, 
urbanization, demography and external demand begin to diminish. With a population that 
the UN projects will touch 1.45 billion in 2030, 60% of whom will live in urban settings, 
with 86% of these expected urban households ranked as “middle class” or “affluent” 
(Farrell et al 2007, figure 6.12) it is entirely logical that the administration will increasing 
look to internal economies of scale to drive the industrialization sub-strategy. 
 
One channel that the strategic leadership should focus on to guide this change is the level 
of the savings rate. In the Japanese context, it was possible to trace the state of strategic 
confidence through the trend in aggregate savings and investment. When Japan’s outward 
oriented industrialization strategy first began attracting doubters in the middle 1970s, we 
saw an asymmetric response emerge. Investment rates declined but savings were 
resilient.  
 
In China we have seen a fascinating savings and investment response in recent years: a 
rise in both measures to levels unheard of in other large economies. The rise in savings 
was initially a rational response by households to the loss of security brought about by 
the lift in unemployment that was created by state owned enterprise restructuring (Huang 
2001).  
 
In the current decade, with millions moving above subsistence income levels, enormous 
numbers of households made a decision between saving and consumption for the first 
time. Under these circumstances a bulge in the savings rate is to be expected. With that in 
mind we might attribute a portion of the rise in overall savings to the increased security 
that has come to many households who are producing surplus income for the first time. 
These are the households formerly ranked as “poor” who have transitioned to “lower 
middle” in figure 6.12. This factor will remain a support for the savings rate out to the 
horizon.  
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Since 2003, which marks the beginning of current growth acceleration, an increase in 
corporate profits has contributed to a sharp rise in gross corporate savings. Gross national 
savings have increased to more than 50% of GDP, accommodating an investment rate 
that has risen to and sustained itself well above 40% of GDP. In 2006, the gap between 
the two - the current account surplus - widened to 9% of GDP. In 2007, a result closer to 
12% is likely (Figure 6.13). 
 
Conventional economic wisdom, encapsulated by the Solow-Swan growth model (Solow 
1956, Swan 1956) and the convergence thesis (Abramovitz 1986, Baumol 1986, Dowrick 
& Nguyen 1989) argues that low income countries should run current account deficits 
through their catch-up phase. These deficits are to be funded by high income countries 
that are in turn advised to run current account surpluses. The relatively high rate of return 
available when capital intensity is low offers the price signal to achieve the desired 
direction of flows. At the same time, low income countries are reminded of a binding 
external financing constraint should any number of levered projects go awry.  
 
China has ignored these conventions by generating excess savings despite also sustaining 
an investment boom. This savings surplus creates great opportunities for China outside of 
the obvious release from the external financing constraint that dogs many low income 
countries. The savings buffer implies that Chinese agents could increase their 
consumption by 9% of GDP without compromising funding for the investment projects 
of strategists. The virtuous circles of expansion that would emerge from a step increase in 
consumption are obvious. Considering the scale of the potential opportunity, a strategic 
leadership observing the current state of affairs is bound to design a policy framework 
that will create the correct incentives for a reduction in savings. A greater level of 
strategic confidence must be ignited in China’s households. 
 
The obvious policies to pursue regarding household savings are those that reduce the 
direct burden on current and future household income. The cost of education, the cost of 
health care, the cost of acquiring real estate and the cost of a self-funded retirement all 
loom large in the thinking of Chinese households (Lane & St-Maurice 2006). A decent 
social safety net, greater access to improved public health and education and a modern 
and competitive financial system would tackle these disincentives to consume current 
income directly. 
 
A modern and competitive financial system would also help to reduce excess corporate 
savings. State owned enterprises have preferential access to bank finance in China for a 
number of historical reasons (Huang 2001). The more dynamic non-state sector, 
particularly small and medium sized firms, are clear outsiders in the credit allocation 
process. The non-state share of gross output has risen from 22% in 1978 to 69% in 2005. 
These firms are forced to rely predominantly on retained earnings for investment, which 
in turn demands that they save more than their state-owned counterparts. Encouraging 
banks to allocate credit on commercial terms at arm’s length will surely help reduce the 
savings rate among China’s dynamic non-state enterprise cohort. The further and highly 
tangible benefit of more efficient capital allocation – in line with strategic price signals - 
would also arise from financial system reform (McKinsey 2006). The introduction of 25 
 
foreign banks into domestic banking business in late 2006, the growing number of initial 
public offerings of former state owned banks and the proliferation of foreign institutions 
taking non-controlling stakes in Chinese banks all speaks of an increase in competition.  
 
More efficient financial intermediation would also improve the rate of return on 
household savings. Weak returns on the savings stock puts a great onus on maintaining 
the flow of savings at a high level. Various generations of Chinese administrators have 
suppressed rates of return to household savings to subsidise the cost of capital to the 
productive sector. Following the end of the inflationary boom of 1993/94, a huge number 
of bad loans engulfed bank balance sheets. This encouraged the administration to further 
suppress returns to savers by keeping deposit rates low to pad bank lending margins 
while they slowly clawed out of the bad loan black hole.  
 
A policy to deregulate interest rates, allowing strategic price signals to operate with 
respect to savings decisions, would be a very constructive reform. Households have 
shown a willingness to respond to price signals when the ability to change asset classes is 
available. The sharp rise in the Chinese equity market in 2006 and 2007 has been 
intimately associated with a diversification of household assets away from bank deposits. 
To a lesser degree, a shift from foreign currency to local currency deposits is underway, 
as the newly flexible renmimbi has made consistent (if moderate) gains against the US 
dollar. 
 
To encourage the state-owned firms to save less, the government has announced that they 
will be required to pay dividends for the first time in 2008. This will not only encourage 
state firms to reduce their savings, it will empower the central government to re-distribute 
these funds to areas that might impact positively on household sentiment. A strategic 
leadership with a starting point of surplus private savings is in prime position to design 
incentives that actively unlock synergies across the strategy function.  
 
7. Counter arguments to the benign China scenario 
 
To this point the argument has been very constructive regarding China’s strategic 
prospects. The current mode of outward oriented industrialization should be well 
supported from a number of angles for at least the next decade and probably much longer. 
The contours of a replacement strategy are already clearly observable, with latent future 
growth evident in the exploitation of internal economies of scale, reform of the financial 
system and a large rise in the private propensity to consume that need not penalize the 
current rate of fixed capital formation.  
 
Against this backdrop it is difficult to picture a scenario where China will experience a 
Japanese style exhaustion of its industrialization strategy within the scope of a couple of 
generations. However, this benign view ignores a number of legitimate risks that could 
undermine Chinese industrialization under either an outward oriented or internally 
focused sub-strategy.  
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This catalogue of potential risks include internal resource and environmental constraints; 
the lack of an indigenous innovation infrastructure; reduced access to foreign technology 
for political reasons; reduced access to foreign resources for political reasons; and 
potentially destabilising military conflict as demands on the global resource stock 
intensifies. We consider the first two points in detail below. 
 
The environmental externalities of Chinese growth are attracting increasing interest (Smil 
2004, Economy 2007, Song 2007b, Qun & Peng 2006, Diamond 2004). China presently 
suffers from a collection of self-created pollution maladies, impacting broadly upon air 
quality and land and water quality and availability. China’s ability to independently feed 
itself is long gone; deforestation, over-grazing and over-cultivation is degrading the 
landscape; severe water scarcity threatens a number of northern cities; water quality is 
heavily compromised by sewerage and industrial wastewater; and a reliance on coal for 
burgeoning energy needs has created pervasive air quality issues.  
As China converges to a more mature energy consumption model it will put greater 
pressure on the environment as it rapidly increases its volume demand for fossil fuels.
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The strategic leadership recognizes that the country is on an unstable environmental 
course. In response, the National Assessment Report on Climate Change, summarized in 
Song (2007), offers a course of action to stabilize and then reduce emissions. Much of the 
work is expected to be done by the developmental gravity of structural change. The 
optimistic view of emissions control is encapsulated by the empirically documented 
“environmental Kuznets curve” (Qun & Peng 2006). Faith in on-going technological 
progress underwrites the overall assessment regarding emissions.  
 
The problem of water scarcity has no ready made solution, in theory or in practice. The 
official forecast is that the country’s water resources will decline from around 2220m
3 
per capita in 1997 to 1760m
3 per capita in 2030. That is just above the formal threshold 
for being classified as “water poor” (Song 2007).  
 
China’s current per capita endowment of arable land, water and rainfall are shown in a 
comparative setting in figure 7.1. These variables are shown in concert with two energy 
related metrics. The “global norm” (the regular pentagon) is the average global 
endowment in each category, which forms the base for the national indices, which in turn 
comprise the irregular pentagons. In per capita terms, China is very poorly endowed with 
water, arable land and rainfall relative to other large, populous nations. Outside of 
thermal coal, China is also well short of self-sufficient reserves in metals and fuel supply, 
even at low per capita consumption rates. China will have to surmount these deficiencies 
through innovation if its industrialization is to continue apace. 
 
Under the existing governance structure any effort to coordinate an economy wide 
reduction in emissions, or to encourage more efficient resource utilization, is bound to 
fall on fallow ground. In contrast to the strong central apparatus of the Japanese state, 
China’s national leadership must rely very heavily on local government officials to carry 
out central directives on the ground. An incentive gap between the capital and the 
provinces, coupled with the difficulties of surveillance and enforcement in as large and 27 
 
diverse a country as China, often prevents Beijing’s best intentioned policies being 
enacted. Critically, lending decisions by the state run banks are brokered at the local 
level. 
 
Local officials often find that their own incentives (maximizing tax revenues, securing 
their own fortunes, surpassing central growth and FDI attraction targets to seek 
promotion) are not consistent with central edicts to reduce funding for polluting 
industries, enforce intellectual property rights, enforce environmental standards, enforce 
worker rights in factories, prevent illegal land seizure by developers, suppress investment 
in resource intensive or over-heated industries, or to limit speculation in the property 
market. China’s volatile ‘business’ cycle in the 1990s, the damaging duplication of 
resources within and across regions, and the non-performing loans this era begat, had the 
fingerprints of the central/local incentive mismatch all over it.  
 
Unless the fundamental tensions in the governance structure are addressed, it is difficult 
to foresee China achieving its national emissions and energy efficiency targets. If China 
misses these targets by wide margins at distant time horizons, the constraints on the 
future path of the industrialization strategy will be severe. 
 
The way to address this issue is to reduce the influence of political and bureaucratic fiat 
in the economy. From a macroeconomic policy perspective that implies a greater reliance 
on market based tools as opposed to administrative ones. Beijing’s collective mind has 
come to a similar conclusion. Interest rate deregulation (Song 2005), exchange rate and 
capital account reform (McKay 2007), product market and services sector deregulation 
(Findlay et al 2007, Huang et al 2007) are all underway to varying degrees in China’s 
patented gradualist style.  
 
The risk that a cyclical downturn will reduce the appetite for change is constantly 
apparent. Timid leadership would delay the moment when market price signals gain 
primacy in directing strategists to the most lucrative projects. Allowing the strategic 
inflation signal to operate without distortion is a prime function of a nation’s strategic 
leadership. Failure on this measure can lead to extremely damaging periods of strategic 
deflation brought about by unwise decisions based on impure pricing signals. Japan’s 
awful experience after 1990 is one example. If China is to avoid a future strategic 
deflation, and transition smoothly from its current sub-strategy prior to its exhaustion, the 
leadership would be well served to cease diluting strategic inflation. 
 
An additional element of risk relates to China’s ability to innovate. It has been noted 
already that the apparent increase in sophistication of Chinese exports is mainly 
explained by the activities of foreign firms. There is a real concern that China’s strategic 
organizations may not be up to the task of endogenous innovation when their cost 
competitiveness erodes.  
 
China’s national champions are huge companies, but they have little or no brand 
recognition outside the country. How many western laymen can name the industries that 
Haier, Gome, Wahaha, Geely, Li Ning, Bird, Lenovo, Tsingtao, Citic and TCL are active 28 
 
in? A “Made in China” label is not a resounding recommendation to a western consumer. 
Japanese manufacturers made their way over that hump, and Korea’s are making their 
way over one industry at a time. Both countries feature strategic organizations that have 
historically competed fiercely via innovation in contested internal oligopolies. China has 
essentially outsourced innovation to the foreign firms who have populated its special 
economic zones. That has sped up the early phases of outward oriented industrialization, 
but it guarantees nothing regards the middle and later stages. 
 
If China is to join the strategic core a century from now, it must reach a point where it is 
independently generating strategic ideas. There is nothing inevitable about this 
development. Those who have looked at the Maddison dataset (2003) and argue that 
China is merely regaining its rightful place in the world are selling snake oil. China (and 
India) fell behind Europe and its offshoots due to failure to technological change as an 
umbrella dynamic strategy until the last few decades. The Neolithic technological 
paradigm that preceded the Industrial Revolution placed land and labour as the key 
determinants of potential output. China had plenty of both of course, which meant it was 
always going to be a large contributor to global output under those particular technical 
conditions.  
 
If we were still in the Neolithic paradigm the reversion to mean argument would by 
viable. However, the current paradigm is dominated by those with the ideas and the depth 
of technology, not the basic resources cherished by Quesnay and his contemporaries. As 
a relatively new participant in the global strategic transition, China is negotiating the 
early stages of industrialisation with aplomb. But future membership of the strategic core 
will depend upon the Chinese ability to innovate and not its brawn.   
 
Is a successful strategic outcome for China all but assured? Of course not. Environmental 
pressures could impinge upon a path of exponential progress. Internal governance issues 
might delay the timing and hamper the implementation of crucial reforms that will keep 
the strategy from transitioning in the desired direction. How China’s strategic vector, 
particular its strategic organizations, will perform at higher income levels is a great 
unknown. None of these risks are trivial. Strategists within and without China would do 
well to heed them. 
 
8. A memorandum on the Australian response 
 
Australia is a resource rich, economically and financially open, reasonably wealthy, 
labour scarce, English speaking and Asian facing economy. The nation is currently 
enjoying a wave of prosperity driven in large part by a boom in its international terms of 
trade. The rise in the terms of trade, has, in turn, been heavily assisted by the sharp lift in 
China’s demand for a broad range of energy, resource and rural commodities that 
Australia has the good fortune to produce. China’s increasing prominence in the 
commodity markets and as a contributor to global growth more generally, has raised the 
sensitivity of the Australian economy to developments in the Middle Kingdom. 
Australia’s strategic outcome in future generations will not be independent of China’s. 
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In section 6 above, arguments that China has a reasonable chance to transition its current 
industrialization sub-strategy successfully prior to its exhaustion were put forward. In 
section 7 important caveats were raised that argued it would be most unwise to assume 
that an adverse outcome is not possible. On balance, the portents for longer run Chinese 
growth are sound but not overwhelming. Australia’s strategic leadership should 
acknowledge this reality and attempt to hedge against the risk of unsuccessful strategic 
transition in China without limiting its ability to leverage off a successful one. 
 
Australia’s GDP per capita relative to the United States has been on a modest upward 
trend for the past five decades (figure 8.1). As a percentage of the US level, Australian 
output per head has ranged between 71% and 81% since 1950. Australia has twice 
retreated from the high point of 81%, in 1975 and in 2003. Where productivity levels 
alone are compared, Australia looks slightly better, reaching a peak level of more than 
85% in the late 1990s.
26 However, when the average rate of productivity convergence 
among OECD countries is accounted for, Australia has proved to be a laggard for the 
majority of the post war period (Dolman 2007).  
 
To put it bluntly, Australia’s strategic outcome over the last half century or so has been 
disappointing. Figure 8.2 illustrates that Australia began the postwar period with living 
standards higher than Canada, Japan and the average of the wealthiest European 
economies. Canada and the Europeans closed the gap quite quickly and have spent a 
great deal of the time period ahead of Australia. The Japanese story is documented 
elsewhere in this paper. Australian living standards exceeded the average OECD level by 
15% in 1950. That gap has narrowed to 5% today. Even the supposed “golden age” did 
not enable Australia to forge ahead in relative terms. Among this sample of peers, 
Australia looks resilient only compared to the disastrous relative decline of New Zealand.  
 
A balanced reading of the data argues that Australia has done little more than benefit 
from outward shifts in the productivity frontier itself while exhibiting only the barest 
rudiments of catching up. It has been unable to make a decisive move into the upper 
echelon of productivity achieved by the leaders of the global strategic transition. As a 
consequence it has produced an underwhelming advance in relative living standards.  The 
corollary of this shortfall is that there has been an historical failure of strategic leadership. 
 
The data would be even less flattering if Australia had not enjoyed a period of 
pronounced strength in the current decade, driven by a historically significant boom in 
the price of resources. This has had a predictably large impact on Australia’s international 
terms of trade (figure 8.3). That has inflated the growth rate of gross national disposable 
income, which has in turn boosted employment growth, labour compensation, profits, 
business investment and taxation revenues. Effective demand has consistently exceeded 
domestic supply potential by a material margin, chewing up the economy’s dwindling 
spare capacity. Interest rates have been raised multiple times in response.  
 
The recent period raises a number of important backward and forward looking questions 
regarding Australia’s choice of dynamic sub-strategy. What was wrong with the historical 
system that left the economy short of aggregate supply capacity in the midst of a once-30 
 
every-other-generation commodity boom? Was this specific shortcoming related to those 
that produced such a meek performance in the preceding fifty years? Should the 
leadership seek to design the future sub-strategy treating the current state of affairs as the 
new norm, or as a temporary windfall? How might the leadership hedge the national 
strategy against the possibility that the windfall thesis is the closest to the truth? 
 
These are substantial questions requiring significant answers. To address them, we recall 
the theory in section 2, which detailed the composition and dynamics of the strategy 
function. The strategic outcome relies upon physical factors, technological factors, 
economies of scale and a vector of strategic variables. The latter, agglomerated as π, 
unlock synergies across the other factors to endow the function with dynamic 
characteristics.  
 
Australia has been well served historically by the basic physical factors that support the 
strategic outcome and offer methodological guidance for the strategic pursuit. Australia’s 
rich natural resource endowment is well known. For the majority of the period of 
European settlement, the exploitation of the resource base has dominated strategic 
thinking (Snooks 2007).  
 
Since 1950 labour input growth has been consistent due to both a declining dependency 
ratio, a strategic increase in female participation (Snooks 1994, 2007) and a steady long 
run net inflow of migrants. Low population density has allowed land intensive activities 
not viable in many competing jurisdictions.  
 
On the other hand, economies of scale have been difficult to achieve with a small 
population and the spatial realities of Australia’s remote location and the pattern of its 
settlement. The Australian economy is still far too small to eschew the benefits of 
external economies of scale. Further, Australia’s geographic remoteness (Blainey 1966) 
has reduced access to the benefits of agglomeration, contiguity and the associated 
lowering of transaction costs identified as significant in the productivity literature 
(Ciccone & Hall 1996, Dolman 2007, Caves 1984). Low population density by global 
standards, despite urbanization expanding rapidly under the paternalistic technological 
paradigm instigated during the inter war period (Snooks 2007), has diluted the potential 
for achieving internal scale economies further.  
 
The leadership’s decision to pursue an inward looking strategy in the 1950s and 1960s is 
particularly perplexing with hindsight, despite the acknowledgement of the geographical 
hurdle. The economy’s laggard performance in this era can be laid squarely at the feet of 
this misguided sub-strategy. High relative transactions costs (e.g. freight) are a major 
handicap in competitive markets for homogeneous goods. Transaction costs are not as 
great a burden in the provision of high value added and/or differentiated goods as they 
comprise only a minor part of the overall cost base. The market for tradable services 
operates under similar parameters. Rather than encouraging Australian strategists to look 
inward – a method that had a low upside – the strategic leadership should have 
encouraged an outward orientation with a focus on selling products and services into 
external markets that others were not.  31 
 
 
The historical quality of Australia’s labour force has also been notably weak in relation to 
the innovative strategists operating at the productivity frontier. Average years of 
schooling have consistently trailed those of the United States, with full catch-up on this 
measure not expected until the late 2020s (Dolman 2007).
27 In the 1940s, the proportion 
of the Australian labour force aged between 55 and 64 years with at least upper 
secondary educational attainment was less than 50%. That compared to a figure above 
80% in the US at the time. Matters have certainly improved since, but a substantial gap 
remains (Davis 2006). To paraphrase Krugman’s (1994) judgement in relation to his 
critique of the Asian economic “miracle”, this was a workforce better adapted for 
perspiration than inspiration. Figure 8.1 shows that Australia’s GDP per capita was closer 
to the US level than GDP per hour worked right up to 1980. That offers further evidence 
that Australian’s were working harder, rather than smarter, in this period.  
 
As for technology, a protracted expansion of business investment characterized the 
1960s, deepening the nation’s capital stock and progressively adding to supply potential. 
We may take this as a sign that strategic confidence was building through the decade, as 
the comfort of years of benign domestic and global demand conditions cumulated in 
agents’ minds. Foreign manufacturing firms contributed to the expansion by bringing 
their technology to Australia, as they chose to invest behind the prevailing tariff walls 
rather than import finished products. Foreign services firms were not all able to 
participate in the same way. Foreign banks, for example, remained locked out until the 
middle of the 1980s. The lack of vibrant competition in the services sector and tight 
regulation reduced the imperative to innovate, leaving productivity levels in these 
activities well behind strategic benchmarks. 
 
As for the strategy vector, comprising leadership, ideas and organizations, by opting for 
and pursuing a sub-optimal strategy, it was a collective drag on the strategic outcome for 
the passage of the 1950s and 1960s. The strategic confidence that developed through the 
1960s, illustrated by the elevated investment ratio, was of a curious nature. Confidence in 
a sub-strategy that is fuelling a rise in relative living standards is one thing. Confidence in 
a sub-strategy that produced stagnant relative living standards is quite another.  
 
A poorly performed leadership, a modestly educated workforce and a wrong-headed 
inward orientation that limited the ability to garner scale economies was not an 
auspicious strategic combination. From the 1970s forward a succession of more decisive 
administrations altered the strategic mood. Reforms of the traded goods sector; finance 
and taxation; transport; utilities; communications; higher education; the labour market, 
monetary, exchange rate and competition policy collectively put the economy on a more 
flexible and outward oriented footing. The fruit of this concentrated strategic effort was a 
starkly improved relative productivity performance in the 1990s. 
 
That brings us back to the recent past. Despite the improved productivity performance in 
the 1990s, strategic confidence ended the decade at a low ebb. Weak corporate and 
household balance sheets at the start of the decade, the strategic deflation of the Japanese 
economy, the dramatic evaporation of strategic confidence in emerging East Asia in 32 
 
1997/98, a downtrend in resources prices that dated back to the 1980s (figure 8.3), a 
lagging exchange rate and the hype associated with the information technology boom, of 
which Australia was not a skilled purveyor, all suppressed confidence at various times. 
When the current decade began with a global equity market crash and an ensuing 
recession in the US, Asia and Europe, confidence took a further hit.  
 
The end result was that the investment share of Australian GDP fell from a late 1980s 
peak of 28% to just 22% in 2000/01. This declining emphasis on building the capital 
stock left supply capability weak when the global demand cycle turned in 2003. At a time 
when the prices of Australian commodity exports essentially tripled, the export volume 
response has been alarmingly weak (figure 8.4). At a time of immensely strong global 
growth, unequalled since the 1960s, manufacturing and services export volumes have 
been feeble (figure 8.5). These resounding external strategic signals have generated a 
private sector investment response (figure 8.6), but a sluggish one given the low base and 
the strong rise in the profit share observed through the period (figure 8.7).  
 
A strategic administration can ratify external strategic signals by boosting its own 
investment in infrastructure. Public infrastructure investment raises private sector 
productivity directly and by encouraging complementary private projects that deepens 
capital stocks within organisations. Despite an ever strengthening fiscal position over the 
last decade, accelerated recently by the terms of trade boom, the lack of investment in the 
scale and quality of Australia’s core infrastructure has been a consistent drag on strategic 
confidence.  
 
A report by Engineers Australia (2005) argues that no segment of the infrastructure sector 
rates an “A”, defined as fully fit for current and anticipated future needs. Roads rated a 
C+; Rail a C–; electricity a C+; gas a C+; irrigation a C–; storm water a C–; ports a C+; 
airports and telecommunications
28 a pair of Bs. The report cited research by a 
consultancy that estimated aggregate under-investment in infrastructure stood at 
$A24.81bn, roughly 2¾% of GDP. That amount pales before the 10% of GDP in actual 
central government surpluses recorded since 1997/98. Clearly, the availability of public 
funds has not been the problem (figure 8.8). Leadership relating to the strategic 
deployment of those funds certainly has been. Regardless of sub-strategic choice, a 
developed nation can not expect to move assertively towards the productivity frontier 
with a recent past of under-investment in capital infrastructure. 
 
Even more damning has been the lack of emphasis on labour quality and innovation. The 
centre of this fundamental imperative is the education system. The number of tertiary 
level students has risen 33% between 1995 and 2003, a relatively large increase for a 
mature country. That spike in student numbers has increased tertiary attainment levels 
among 25 to 64 year olds above the OECD average to a level 79% of the US’ in 2004, 
versus 73% in 1995. However, Australia is an egregious outlier among mature countries 
with real expenditure per student in tertiary education declining by 6% in the same 
period. (OECD 2007: 183). The next worst performance was flat real expenditure. And 
that is despite fiscal pressures in Europe and North America not evident in Australia. 
Australia looks more average when levels of spending are compared. But one certainly 33 
 
sees a lack of strategic ambition when Australian outlays per student are less than half 
those of the United States. This is not the way to build a workforce that will innovate its 
way into the upper echelons of productivity. 
 
For the education sector as a whole, public outlays have fallen from 4.5% of GDP in 
1995 to 4.3% of GDP in 2003. Including private expenditures, the national total rose 
from 5.5% to 5.8% in the same timeframe. That is below the OECD average and around 
77% of the US level in 2003. In 1995, total education outlays were 76% of the US’ 
(OECD 2007: 185).  
 
At a time of remarkable fiscal flexibility for Australia, these quantitative measures of the 
administrative focus on education point towards a middling interest and a void of 
ambition. Two offshoots of Australia’s unexceptional education outcomes are the weak 
state of the research and development (hereafter R&D) sector and a poor relative record 
of international patent filings. 
 
At just 1.64% of GDP, Australian R&D outlays are just 62% of the US level. The 
Japanese and Scandinavian economies routinely invest at double the Australian level. 
Australia employs fewer researchers per capita than the US (81%) who in turn supply less 
than a third of the US’ output of patents per capita (OECD 2007: 146-51). As figure 8.9 
shows, moderate under-performance in quantitative commitments to education and 
innovation becomes major under-performance in the quality of system output.  
 
If Australia’s strategic organizations wished to compete with the United States and others 
in generating strategic ideas, the least they could do would be to put an equivalent 
amount of resources into research. The data presented above says that this is not 
happening. On no measure across the broad category of education, research and 
innovation does Australia match or surpass the equivalent US level. On many measures it 
is a laggard not just relative to the US, but to the OECD average as well.  
 
Interestingly, one of Australia’s stronger relative performances is in the scaled number of 
researchers employed. When we match this commitment to output of patents, the phrase 
“harder, not smarter” again springs to mind. To repeat the data presented above, with 
81% of the US level researchers per head, Australia produces less than a third of the 
international patents per head. The strategic organizations in the United States employing 
these researchers enjoy triple the pay-off of their Australian counterparts.
29 
  
There are strong, divergent strategic signals operating in the two economies. In Australia, 
R&D has shown a low return on investment, disallowing the rise of confidence among 
strategists in an innovation sub-strategy. In the United States, R&D has shown a much 
higher rate of return, and therefore strategists are happy to channel resources into 
innovative endeavours.  
 
The reasons for the large gap in historical experience are related to the quality of the 
researchers themselves, the resources they are given to work with, scale factors and 
incentive systems within organizations and in the wider policy context. Taxation 34 
 
incentives for R&D, the level of income tax, intellectual property rights protection, the 
user cost of education, the expected private return to education, immigration policy and 
competition policy are all relevant to the discussion of innovation. If Australia’s strategic 
leadership were serious about reaching US productivity levels, a much more 
accommodative policy framework would have been in place a long time ago. Further, a 
greater emphasis on educational catch-up would be observed, so that local organizations 
willing to invest in research have competitive employment options. Yet it is hard to 
escape the fact that the relative and absolute quality of Australia’s labour force has been 
held back by a meek investment in the education infrastructure.  
 
The joint evidence of under-investment in capital and education infrastructure infers that 
the administrations of the last decade or so have harboured extremely timid ambitions for 
Australia’s strategic outcome. A serious tilt at catch-up to the leaders of the global 
strategic transition, building on the successful unwinding of the many negative distortions 
of the paternalistic era, would have necessarily elevated education and capital 
infrastructure to the forefront of thinking. Rather, official discourse has focused on a 
blind adherence to the mundanities of fiscal austerity and inflation targets. Each of these 
objectives, by definition, suppresses out-sized strategic price signals: the very signals that 
a strategic leadership should allow to display at full prominence. Ergo, these twin pillars 
of contemporary Australian policy are damaging tools in the wrong hands.  
 
The task for the future leadership is to recast the emphasis. The inflation targeting regime 
should be much more flexible to allow strategic inflation to resonate through the system. 
The current scenario is a prime illustration. In the midst of its largest positive terms of 
trade shock in fifty years the Australian economy is facing pervasive capacity shortages 
in both labour and capital. This is underwriting gains in factor and asset prices and 
worrying the monetary authorities, who have a target to uphold. But as this target is 
achieved through the manipulation of demand via an interest rate instrument, it is more 
likely to exacerbate the problem than serve as a part of the solution.  
 
Increasing the returns to employment (raising wages for incumbents and attracting non-
participants) and increasing investment in infrastructure and the rest of the capital stock is 
the correct response to the contemporary demand environment. Yet wage rises (or 
participation enhancing tax cuts) would be guaranteed to put the inflation target under 
even greater pressure. An investment boom is likewise not on the monetary authority’s 
wish list when prices are already dangerously close to its target ceiling. So we have the 
awkward situation where it can be argued that the monetary authority’s short run 
incentives are not consistent with the nation’s medium term strategic interest.  
 
As stated above, administrations should distinguish between strategic and nominal 
inflation. Further, an understanding of cyclical and structural elements of inflation 
changes is crucial for well designed policy. If the current terms of trade boom were 
deemed to be permanent, it would be wasteful to dull its impact through counter-cyclical 
policy. If it was not deemed to be permanent, but the strength of the nominal signal was 
anticipated to be too strong for strategists too resist, then an activity dampening policy 
would be appropriate.  35 
 
 
These final points bring us to the critical judgements facing Australian strategists today. 
Is a resource exploiting, externally leveraged sub-strategy - Australia’s historical forte – 
also the best option for the future? Is the rise of China, and everything it promises for 
resource rich locales, communicating a strategic signal that should not be ignored?  
 
In the face of this uncertainty, Australian strategists are thankfully not facing an 
independent binary choice. China’s own strategic prospects for coming generations are 
sound but not overwhelmingly so. To enhance the national capability to leverage the 
benign China story, upgrading the nation’s stock of physical infrastructure is the obvious 
strategic project. To hedge against the possibility of the more pessimistic projections 
coming to fruition in China, thereby unhinging a resource dependent sub-strategy, 
Australia must make an independent effort to achieve an assertive move towards the 
upper echelons of global productivity performance. This will involve a wholesale 
reassessment of the scale of resources that should be directed to the education sector and 
by extension, the research/innovation infrastructure.  
 
Australia has a store of “advantages of backwardness” in education: latent but prime for 
mobilisation. The huge financial buffer created by the terms of trade boom, both in terms 
of income flows and the growing wealth stock, offers the leadership an exceptional 
opportunity to finance this enormous task without unduly hindering other on-going 
commitments.  
 
This statement does not ignore the realities of fiscal policy in the face of a rising 
dependency ratio through ageing as outlined in the second Intergenerational Report 
(hereafter IGR, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). Yet a successful transition to an 
endogenously determined dynamic process will see long run productivity growth out-
strip the modest projections in the IGR.  
 
The IGR assumes 1.8% long run productivity growth in its core scenarios: or a tick below 
a consensus of long run estimates of productivity growth in the US (Dolman 2007). That 
implies that the current administration is content to argue that there will be no catch-up 
to the global leadership over a horizon long enough that it is tractable to assume a blank 
sheet for policy and strategic direction. Surely no more pessimistic statement has ever 
been communicated to a nation’s potential strategists. A new pattern of thinking is clearly 
warranted if Australia is to improve on the disappointing strategic outcomes of the prior 
half century. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
This essay has considered the economic performance of East Asia’s two largest 
economies in the context of dynamic strategy theory. First in Japan, and then later in 
China, two ‘developmental’ states adopted strikingly successful industrialisation 
strategies with a common thread of outward orientation. Japan’s strategy matured in the 
1970s, exhausted sometime after, and pitched the economy into a painful deflation in the 
1990s. China’s own outward-oriented strategy, which is currently stimulating rapid 36 
 
economic growth and differs in many important respects from Japan’s, was then analysed 
in an attempt to examine its future viability.  
 
China’s prospects for adapting an alternative strategy prior to exhaustion were then 
considered. The conclusion was that it is reasonable to expect China’s strategic 
leadership to attempt to transition towards a sub-strategy that continues to sponsor 
industrialization through exploitation of the mass internal market in the broad context of 
outward orientation. Furthermore, the contemporary sub-strategy is clearly far from 
exhausting itself. However, the risks surrounding the transition, ranging from the 
environment, to governance, to resource availability, are far from trivial. On balance, the 
portents for long run Chinese growth are sound but not overwhelming.  
 
An Asian-facing resource rich economy such as Australia would do well to bear these 
risks factors in mind. Acknowledging these realities, Australia’s strategic leadership 
should attempt to hedge against the risk of unsuccessful strategic transition in China 
without limiting its ability to leverage off a successful one. 
 
In the face of this uncertainty, Australian strategists are thankfully not facing an 
independent binary choice. Upgrading the nation’s stock of physical infrastructure is the 
obvious strategic project that will enhance Australia’s ability to leverage off a benign 
Chinese growth story. To hedge against the possibility of the more pessimistic 
projections coming to fruition in China, thereby unhinging a national resource reliant 
sub-strategy, Australia must make an independent effort to lift itself towards the upper 
echelons of productivity performance. This will involve a wholesale reassessment of the 
scale of national resources that should be directed to sparking an endogenous dynamism 
mechanism built upon a vastly improved innovation infrastructure.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 “East Asia” describes the nation-states commanding that portion of the Eurasian continent that faces the 
Pacific. Specifically, in this paper “East Asia” will mean a composite of Japan, Greater China (the People’s 
Republic, Hong Kong special administrative region and Taiwan province), the Republic of Korea (the 
South), Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Other country groups referred to are 
the Newly Industrialised Economies (the NIEs: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore); the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN: Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines). At 
other times it may be useful to refer to East Asia ex Japan, or ex Japan and China. India and other South 
Asian or land-locked countries are not included. Nor are the non-strategic states (Snooks 1998) in the 
region such as Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Mongolia, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (the 
North), Laos and Papua New Guinea. Vietnam is included selectively where data constraints allow. Where 
weighted regional aggregates are presented, purchasing power parity exchange rates are used for the 
computation. 
2 Gross national disposable income (GNDI) is a preferable measure of the strategic outcome to the more 
common gross domestic product (GDP). GNDI is a purchasing power concept that is superior to the supply 
based GDP. To calculate GNDI, exports are deflated by the import deflator to capture their worth in barter. 
GNDI is therefore better suited to capture the price signal from the international terms of trade that is 
central to the strategic feedback mechanism. However, comparable time series of GNDI are not readily 
available for Japan and China, so GDP will have to suffice. For details on the respective measures, see ABS 
(2000) chapter eight. 37 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Strategic leadership can come from any agents able to provide or control the signaling mechanisms in the 
economy that impact upon strategic confidence. The strategic administration (the bureaucracy and the 
executive) is the most important element of strategic leadership, but the role is not necessarily a state 
monopoly. In practice, any agent with an encompassing interest is a candidate. 
4 All figures cited here are author calculations from underlying data sourced from the Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre and the Conference Board Total Economy Database, www.ggdc.net. National 
data are measured in 1990 US dollars converted using Geary Khamis purchasing power parities. 
5 Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law was revised in December 1980 to make foreign 
exchange transactions “free in principle”. The real demand criterion for foreign exchange transactions was 
dropped in 1984. Prior to these revisions, any foreign exchange transaction theoretically had to be approved 
by the Finance Ministry. See McKay (2004). For a narrative of financial reform see Brown (1994). 
6 An “exportable” is a good or service that may be sold either locally or in the global market. An 
“importable” is a good or service that may be imported or produced locally. The realised traded share of 
these categories can be influenced by strategic policy makers. 
7 This is a variation on the “Old Bolshevick” notion of primitive socialist accumulation via strategic 
sectoral price distortions associated with Preobrazhensky (1967) and Bukharin. 
8 All price data in this section is sourced from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators database accessed 
via the Econdata subscription software package. 
9 An in-depth discussion of cycle/wave theory is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that the 
school of thought ascribing a regular rhythm to economic activity and prices of predictable duration has 
been discredited (Solomou 1990, Snooks 1998a). While no consensus has emerged after the fall of the 
Kondratieff, the concept that attracts the author’s sympathy is that “wave-like surges”, of various duration 
and fluctuating amplitude are evident on a balanced reading of the data. These wave-like surges are 
associated with the rise and decline of dynamic strategies and sub-strategies at the highest level (Snooks 
1996, 1998a, 1999). The Marxist view of the long cycle remains extant (Mandel 1995), and the 
Schumpeterian (1939) and Kuznetsian (1930) propositions modified to allow for the arrhythmic nature of 
the developing historical record, retain proponents.  A comprehensive survey of the pre-Snooks literature is 
available in Rostow (1990). 
10 Strategic imitation in Snooks (1998a) is not the same thing as “entrepreneurial swarming” in Schumpeter. 
The key difference is that imitation in Snooks is a device for preserving the scarcest resource, intellect. 
There is no inevitable driving down of prices/profits under strategic imitation, as there is in Schumpeterian 
swarming. Indeed, strategic confidence may be consolidated and sustained by imitation, rather than being 
destroyed by it. 
11 Rostow (1973 [1960]) popularised the “leading sector” thesis of “take-off”. This observation is not 
intended to echo the Rostowian tradition. His descriptive schema is no longer fashionable as it does not sit 
well with empirical developments since its publication.    
12 Olson (1971, 1982) offers the concept of the “distributional coalition”. Such organisations are anti-
strategic, as their chief concern is the distribution of the aggregate surplus (rent seeking), not surplus 
generation, which is the occupation of the strategic leadership and strategic organisations (Snooks 1998a). 
13 It is the author’s opinion that South Korea has reached a similar point with its consumer electronics 
sector, while its automobile industry still has some way to go. The question of South Korea’s strategic 
pursuit is the topic of a future paper.  
14 These arguments are also relevant to the relationship between non-financial firms and their “main 
banks”. See Aoki et al (1994) and Sheard (1996) for a discussion of the main bank system. See McKay 
(1999) for an analysis of its relationship to broader national strategy over the course of the post war period. 
15 This phrase is associated with the work of Alice Amsden (1988, 2001). It was originally coined to 
describe the South Korean approach to outward oriented industrialization. 
16 The utility of exchange rate theory is limited by its inability to meet undemanding performance hurdles 
in a short or medium term forecasting environment, even with assumed foreknowledge of fundamental 
explanatory variables (Meese and Rogoff 1983). However, purchasing power parities, based on the law of 
one price, do have some predictive power over long horizons, and may be usefully employed over the 
course of decades, if not years (Froot & Rogoff 2005: 1658-1662).   
17 This metaphor is used advisedly and with apologies to the profound message of Shusaku Endo’s Silence 
(1980). 38 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The reader will note that in the discussion of Japanese development above, export, import and trade to 
GDP ratios were referred to frequently. The lack of a major FDI presence in Japan and the fact of a low 
import content in its manufactures through the industrialisation phase, a discretionary choice by the 
strategic administration, make this a defensible abstraction.  
19 These figures are inflated by the phenomenon of “round tripping”, whereby funds are send offshore and 
returned as “foreign investment” to take advantage of the tax concessions that have been available. The 
degree of over-statement is debated, but there is no doubt that it is significant. The dominance of flows 
from Hong Kong and offshore tax havens is a shadow of this practice. See Chen (2007) for a discussion. 
The author’s view is that this phenomenon will become less important following the equalisation of tax 
rates for foreign and local firms at 25% this year. That constitutes a rise in tax rates for foreign firms and a 
decline for domestic firms. 
20 Source is as detailed in note 4. 
21 This point has been made forcibly to the author by a number of figures in China’s economic bureaucracy. 
Quantitative examinations of the “pull” and “push” factors driving Chinese internal migration do not 
explicitly model the distortions created by hukou. For two examples of these studies, see Song & Yu (2005) 
and Young & Deng (1998). 
22 A personal communication from a scholar at the Research Centre for Rural Economy, under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Beijing, 11 September 2006. 
23 This is not to trivialise the immense challenge of wholesale land reform, the difficulty being amplified by 
the lack of a rigorous ex ante property rights regimen. Hukou reform, on the other hand, is a much easier 
matter, being at heart a fiscal policy issue. 
24 For a re-casting of the demographic transition as a dynamic strategic concept, see Snooks (1999: chapter 
13). 
25 The average OECD country’s energy use by sector can be stylised as one-third industry, one-third 
transport and one-third households. In China, industry is closer to one-half with transport vastly under-
represented at one-tenth. As automobile ownership rises alongside urban incomes, this sector will increase 
its share of overall energy consumption rapidly. 
26 The source for all comparative data is as detailed in note 4. 
27 The timing of Australian catch-up may be too optimistic, as the rise in elder workers participating in 
education in recent years has been extrapolated by the authors of Dolman (2007). This jump in the 
participation numbers may reflect something other than a new norm, such as individuals making up for 
previous sins. Therefore, we might class this projection as something close to a best case scenario. 
28 Telecommunications rating is for 2001. 
29 This obviously assumes that all patents are born equal. This is unrealistic, as the code for MS-DOS has 
proved to be more valuable than the specifications for the Beta video recorder for instance. However, there 
is no evidence that Australia is turning out fewer but more valuable patents and the US is doing the reverse. 
If this were the case, it would show up in the macroeconomic numbers the analysis is framed around. Asian industrialisation
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